Tu Quoque

Thought on what we take serious

2009-07-31T05:23:00.000-07:00

Americans generally have an abysmal level of knowledge of the Bible. In this world of mass ignorance, to have headlines proclaim that this or that fact about [Jesus] has been declared untrue by supposedly scientific inquiry has the effect of gospel. There is no basis on which most people can counter these authoritative-sounding statements. - LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON

Still Selling Books at Ebay

2008-04-16T09:54:00.001-07:00

I am continuing to post theology, apologetics, philosophy, and other academic books for sale at Ebay. I will be selling about three hundred or more books over the next month or two, so keep checking back in. All but two of my current titles have sold, so be sure and bid strong if you are interested in a title.

If you are interested, my Ebay user ID is Marzzhill, or you can simply go to this - a link to my user profile page. All of my books will be listed there.

Books for Sale

2008-04-11T09:59:00.001-07:00

If you are interested in buying some theology texts, general Christian reading, historical texts, apologetics, etc. Then know that I am actually selling a very large portion of my library at Ebay beginning today. I will be posting books for sale over the next few weeks. The ones that do not sell at Ebay will be taken to the local used book store and/or sold at our upcoming garage sale this summer.

To find my sales on Ebay - my user name is Marzzhill. You can search by member user name at Ebay - if you have trouble finding me at Ebay then here is a link to my user profile page.

Is God beyond Logic?

2007-03-09T12:54:00.000-08:00

The other day I was asked this question:

My question involves an argument (debate) I'm having with a skeptical friend. He presented an argument I haven't heard before, and I would like to hear your thoughts (even a hint would be nice). His argument is as follows:

"God is suprarational...that is, he exists above man's logic. It is thus impossible to prove God exists with a weaker (or even if you want to give it equivalent) form of logic."

First, I don't think the conclusion follows. I've tried to find the hidden premise of the enthymeme, but I can't seem to do it without using four terms. So from a logic standpoint, I'm having a hard time checking for validity. Assuming it is valid, what do you think of his first premise? I may be way off, but doesn't his argument assume God exists in the first premise? Is that something I could use? Is there some material fallacy I'm missing here?

Here is my response:

OK let's see - first we need to make this argument plain by supplying premise (2). BTW: Sometimes just forcing the objector to make their argument clear shows its faults, and it avoids you accidentally arguing against a straw man, so I would avoid doing it for them. But just for fun I will assume that I have caught his implied point and look at it from that angle. So here is the argument reconstructed into a valid form by adding Premise (2):

1. God is suprarational that is, he exists above man's logic.
2. [Supplied] Things which exist above man's logic are impossible to prove with a weaker / equivalent form of logic.
3. Therefore, it is impossible to prove God exists with a weaker / equivalent form of logic.

There are numerous problems with this line of thinking. I will go premise by premise.

Premise (1): What exactly does "above" mean here? Is he speaking metaphysically? Well, then all existing extra-mental objects are "above" logic - what does that prove? God's being "above logic" in this sense says nothing of logic's ability to deal with Him as a subject. I would ask if this is a rational or irrational idea. If it is irrational there is no need to deal with it. If it is rational then it is self-defeating for it is making a rational claim about God that rational claims about God cannot be made. In much the same way, if he wants to claim that God cannot be treated by logical argument then his whole project is self-defeating.

Premise (2): Ignoring the "weaker / equivalent" distinction (I have no idea how to put logics on a scale such as this), the biggest problem with this whole line of thinking is the idea that logic proves things about extra-mental reality in the first place. That is not logic's job. Validity (based on argument forms), which logic can prove, is not equivalent to soundness (truth based on correspondence to reality), which logic cannot prove. An argument's soundness comes from having valid form and true premises. But truth is dependant on a statement's correspondence to reality - not its placement in an argument. So, in this sense, logic cannot prove ANYTHING - much less God. Nor are we asking it to. HOWEVER . . . arguing logically is not the same as using logic (alone) to argue. Rather, our logical arguments must be supported by evidence from the real world. Then, if they are logically valid, they are also sound and the conclusions can only be rejected on pains of irrationality.

Conclusion (3): Because neither premise is true (at least in the sense he seems to mean them) the argument is unsound. If he means something else by premise (1) then I'd have to see it to properly comment on it.

Also, although his argument does seem to assume that God exists he may simply be speaking hypothetically, so I would not try to use that. His argument could be easily adjusted to avoid this flaw. All he would need to do is say, "If God existed, then [insert Premise (1)]."

Any additional thoughts or helpful criticism?

why logic is crucial in theology

2007-02-02T08:13:00.000-08:00

A Mormon buddy was witnessing to me over email the other day, citing Stephen Robinson on the a priori reasonableness of God having a body:

"The logic is not difficult: Jesus is God; Jesus has a body of flesh and bones; therefore, God, in the person of the resurrected Son, has a body of flesh and bones."

It took me a second. It took me another second. And then I realized: categorical logic is finally going to come handy. Okay, first, I took a prima facie look at Dr. Robinson's "not difficult" "logic":

S is P
S is R
-------
Therefore, P is R

Invalid

Okay, but why? Let's rewrite this a bit:

S - the person of Jesus Christ.
P - God
R - a body of flesh and bones.

So Dr. Robinson's logic, using the above key:

S is P;
S is R;
Therefore, P (in S) is R.

Problems are as follows. First, he uses four terms, and you can only have three terms in a syllogism. The fourth term is 'P (in S)' and this is neither P nor S. This is called either equivocation or four-term fallacy. Second, terms distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in the premises. Yet the group of statements does not have P (in S) distributed in the premises; it doesn't even show up in the premises; P itself is undistributed. This is sometimes called illicit process. Thus, he has broken two rules in this simple syllogism. Invalid.

My Mormon friend told me at this point that I was trying to refute him on a "technicality." I really wasn't.

On the contrary, I even considered collapsing that fourth term to be "God." The problem is that even with three terms like that, it is still invalid, because God is undistributed in the conclusion but not in the premises. That's illicit process of the minor term, as I mentioned. In other words, it is also wrong if thought:

1) Jesus is God.
2) Jesus has a body of flesh and bones.
3) Therefore, God has a body of flesh and bones.

because

1) Jesus is God (undistributed).
3) Therefore, God (distributed) has a body of flesh and bones.

This in itself does not mean that the conclusion is false, but just that the "argument" used to support it is invalid. Invalid reasoning is used to falsely support true conclusions all the time.

My reasons for rejecting the notion that God is immaterial are fairly common and so I will not lay them out here. But anyway, that was my beginner's analysis of what seemed to be a hopeless example of "not difficult" "logic," from a highly respected Mormon scholar. Does anyone know a way to salvage or rewrite Robinson's group of statements, so as to make a valid argument?

Some Reviews on Bart's Gospel

2007-01-05T12:59:00.000-08:00

Bart Ehrman's Misquoting Jesus is meant to be an lay introduction to textual criticism, and it was quite popular. It also suffers from bias. This is not at all surprising to me. I took his Introduction to New Testament while at UNC-Chapel Hill. Even to a then-freshman like myself, it was obvious how opinions were easily shaped by the bias of a professor.

Daniel Wallace is an accomplished scholar in the field of textual criticism. As I read his review "The Gospel According to Bart" a month or so ago in a journal, I thought to myself, it would be cool if this was on the internet. Indeed, there it is.

While we are at it, here is another critique by well-renowned scholar, blogger, and fellow UNC alum, Ben Witherington. Enjoy.

UPDATE: Thom Howe's review is online here and presents some important criticisms not necessarily found in the other reviews. Enjoy.

Also, a lively debate between Bill Craig and Ehrman on the issue of the historicity of the resurrection. (hat tip: Davis)

TuQuoque hits the big time!

2006-10-18T16:58:00.000-07:00

So I got this e-mail a while back from Loyola Press asking if they could use one of my TuQuoque articles in an upcoming book. The book turned out to be The Best of Catholic Writing - 2006. I found it rather humorous that a Protestant ("and fiercely proud of it!") author should be included in a Roman Catholic "best of" book but hey - I'll take it!

Anyway, it's been released to at least one rave review. Publishers Weekly gave it a starred review saying that "[Editor, Brian] Doyle assembles a truly "catholic" compilation . . . a true sign of the times—excerpts from Web logs ("blogs"). Kudos to Doyle for recognizing the creativity and vitality within this modern electronic medium. Catholicism, Doyle believes, should not be afraid of contemporary culture. Nor should it be afraid of a variety of perspectives. Doyle includes . . . a Thomas Aquinas–inspired spoof called "The Existence of Chuck Norris" by ordained Protestant minister Douglas Beaumont. . . ."

Woo Hoo! Anyway, TuQuoque is mentioned several times in the book so perhaps all of us will start contributing more even though we've all sort of moved on to our own BLOGS as of late.

Five Point Thomism?

2006-08-08T11:03:00.000-07:00

In partial response to the Roman Catholic who seemed upset that a bunch of Protestants would create a BLOG on Thomism, I don't think there is anything incoherent about being a thomist and not Roman Catholic because thomism is not a strictly religious designation.

Anway - I think we need some statement - minimal description / definition - of what we mean by "Thomism".

(Plus it would be cool if we could make it into a cool acronym like TULIP or CHRYSANTHEMUM.)

Universe by Design: God and Cosmological Constants

2006-07-26T13:22:00.000-07:00

Perhaps the most compelling arguments for design in the universe are found in what are known as cosmological constants. These facts are commonly referred to as arguments from the fine-tuning of the universe.

When scientists speak of the fine-tuning of the universe, they are generally referring to the extraordinary balancing of the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial conditions of the universe. The result of these constants is that the universe has just the right conditions to sustain life. The coincidence of all of these constants being so life permitting are too amazing to have been the result of happenstance. These cosmological constants all work together to keep the universe perfectly dialed in order to make life possible. In his article titled God, Design, and Fine-Tuning, physicist Robin Collins gave the following illustration to help explain these constants:

"I like to use the analogy of astronauts landing on Mars and finding an enclosed biosphere, sort of like the domed structure that was built in Arizona a few years ago. At the control panel they find that all the dials for its environment are set just right for life. The oxygen ratio is perfect; the temperature is seventy degrees; the humidity is fifty percent; theres a system for replenishing the air; there are systems for producing food, generating energy, and disposing of wastes. Each dial has a huge range of possible settings, and you can see if you were to adjust one or more of them just a little bit, the environment would go out of whack and life would be impossible. What conclusion would we draw from finding this structure? Would we draw the conclusion that it just happened to form by chance? Certainly not. Instead, we would unanimously conclude that it was designed by some intelligent being. Why would we draw this conclusion? Because an intelligent designer appears to be the only plausible explanation for the existence of the structure."

According to recent findings in physics, the universe is analogous to this "biosphere" that Collins illustrates. Over the past thirty years or so, scientists have discovered that just about everything about the basic structure of the universe is balanced on a razors edge for life to exist. The coincidences are far too fantastic to attribute this to mere chance or to claim that it needs no explanation. The dials are set too precisely to have been a random accident. Somebody, as Fred Hoyle quipped, "has been monkeying with the physics." The point is that when scientists look at the universe from an objective perspective, every knob in the discipline of physics seems to be intelligently dialed to a perfect degree in order to permit life in our universe. It is this evidence that leads to the conclusion that there is an Intelligent Designer behind these harmonious scientific facts. The following are some amazing examples of the finely tuned cosmological constants that balance the universe:

1. If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as little as 1 part in 1060, the universe would have either quickly collapsed back on itself, or expanded too rapidly for stars to form. In either case, life would be impossible. (An accuracy of one part in 10-60 can be compared to firing a bullet at a one-inch target on the other side of the observable universe, twenty billion light years away, and hitting the target.)

2. Calculations indicate that if the strong nuclear force, the force that binds protons and neutrons together in an atom, had been stronger or weaker by as little as 5% life would be impossible.

3. Calculations show that if gravity had been stronger or weaker by 1 part in 10-40, then life-sustaining stars like the sun could not exist. This would most likely make life impossible.

4. Further calculations show that if the neutron were not about 1.001 times the mass of the proton, all protons would have decayed into neutrons or all neutrons would have decayed into protons, and thus life would not be possible.

5. In the formation of the universe, the balance of matter to antimatter had to be accurate to one part in ten billion for the universe to arise.
6. Any of the laws of physics can be described as a function of the velocity of light (now defined to be 186,282 miles per second). Even a slight variation in the speed of light would alter the other constants and preclude the possibility of life on earth.

7. For the universe to exist as it does requires that hydrogen be converted to helium in a precise but comparatively stately mannerspecifically, in a way that converts seven one thousandths of its mass to energy. Lower that value very slightlyfrom 0.007 percent to 0.006 percent, sayand no transformation could take place: the universe would consist of hydrogen and nothing else. Raise the value very slightlyto 0.008 percentand bonding would be so widely prolific that the hydrogen would long since have been exhausted. In either case, with the slightest tweaking of the numbers the universe as we know and need it would not be here.

These examples are just some of the many amazing constants that are present in the universe in which we live. The astronomical amount of fine-tuning that we see in these constants weighs heavily in favor of a Great Designer of the universe. There must have been a Super Intelligence who set the dials perfectly in order for galaxies, stars, and planets to be positioned just right in order for life to be possible here on earth. To put it in terms harmonious with William Paleys argument, the incredible amount of design in the universe leads to the conclusion that there is an incredible Designer of the universe.

Comments on Mere Comments

2006-06-11T06:11:00.000-07:00

In my last post on the important Bush / Beaumont summit, Flavis sent a link to an article on predestination. He asked for comments on it:

http://merecomments.typepad.com/merecomments/2006/06/being_and_causa.html

The author of this article is a (pontificator corrected me here, the author is a catholic) named Anthony Esolen. Let's start by giving some quotes from the Angelic Doctor himself that are relevant to what Esolen said.

Chapter 89 of SCG Book 3, Part 2, concerning "That the movement of the will is caused by God and not only the power of the will" Aquinas says,

“God not only gives powers to things but, beyond that, no thing can act by its own
power unless it acts through His power… man cannot use the power of will that
has been given him except in so far as he acts through the power of God. Now,
the being through whose power the agent acts is the cause not only of the power,
but also of the act… Therefore, God is for us the cause not only of our will, but
also of our act of willing.”

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Book 3: Part 2, (United States:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.), 36.

In the next section Aquinas shows that mans will is subject to divine providence. In this context he says, "since [God] is the cause of our act of choice and volition, our choices and will-acts are subject to divine providence." page 37. Concerning "How human events may be traced back to higher causes" Aquinas says "Of course, acts of choice and movements of the will are controlled immediately by God." He continues, "So, the movement of all wills and choices must be traced back to the divine will, and not to any other cause, for God alone is the cause of our acts of will and choice." page 40-41.

Clearly, for Aquinas, God's causal power extended beyond the fact of free will to the very acts of free will. No choice is made independently of God's causality. Of course this raises a ton of questions, but Aquinas has a keen ability to see potential questions and answer them.

The reason God must be the cause is because He is simple. Since He is simple, He cannot be affected by creatures. Also, because he is simple, His knowledge is immutable and His knowledge cannot be affected by creatures. God is related to the world as Cause is related to effect. God knows the world because God is the cause of the world. God's causality, like His knowledge, does not stop at the power of free will.

Fr. Reginald Garrigou-LaGrange states Aquinas' definition of predestination as "The type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind... The number of the predestined is certain to God, not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of principal preordination" You CANNOT say of Aquinas that he thought that God was passive with regard to our free choices. NOTHING is outside of God's providence and control.

Calvinists who use Aquinas often times don't realize how far Aquinas goes. Many of the Calvinists that I have spoken with suppose that we have free will with regard to most of our choices. Of course they claim that we are free only to choose among evil options before God regenerates us, but I often hear them make distinctions between common choices and the "choice" of salvation. For them, we are free to make whatever choices we want before and after salvation, but salvation is marked by it's being uniquely caused by God. (And though they almost always deny it, God causes our salvation against our will because, on their view, we would never will it apart from God's causing it.) For Aquinas, no choice is made independently of God; whether it be the choice of salvation or the choice of eating a banana or a candy bar.

If that is the case, the most obvious question deals with whether or not man is free. I don't think Aquinas was a compatiblist. (Though I think my philosophy professor disagrees) I don't know if Aquinas was a liberatarian. However, it does seem that Aquinas believed that we had a genuine ability to make choices. Not independent from God, but free none the less. I think that most Aquinas scholars hold that Aquinas held to some kind of dual causality. Some think that man's choices involve two efficient causes, where God is the primary efficient Cause and man is the secondary efficient cause. Others think that God is the formal Cause of our actions and that we are the efficient cause of our action. I am not qualified to debate the issue either way.

The point is that there are ways of affirming, without contradiction, that God and man are both involved in mans acts of free will. It is difficult to respond to Dr. Esolen's post because he is speaking more in theological terms. I would be interested in seeing what he makes of this post.

I'm the 100th post, I'm the 100th post!!!!

2006-06-07T09:45:00.000-07:00

Uh . . . I guess I should say something thomistic or something.
Um . . .
OK, act in the order in which it is act is unique and unlimited unless cojoined to passive potency.
There, now doesn't that feel nice???

Dan Brown and the Illuminati

2006-05-24T08:57:00.000-07:00

I was on the porcelain throne the other day and in a moment of bladder emptying bliss I had a moment of frightening clarity. I think I can prove without a doubt that DaVinci Code author Dan Brown is a member (if not the leader) of the Illuminati and is pushing the world to the brink of a worldwide crisis.

My first thought was that in Brown’s ridiculous theory concerning the Holy Grail that about the only group he does not reference in connection with the greatest cover-up in world history is the Illuminati. It’s not bad enough that DaVinci Code mangles historical fact beyond recognition, or that Brown implicates everyone from the apostle Thomas to the curator of the Louvre in this conspiracy, but then he misses a prime opportunity to involve the Illuminati! It all seemed so foolish until I flushed . . . then the oblivious became obvious.

For those of you who have lived in a cave for the last few centuries, or who have never listened to Art Bell, the Illuminati are well known as the instigators of . . . well . . . everything that has ever happened, I think. Of course no one knows who they are or how they manage to pull it all off, but if there is a conspiracy you can pretty well bet the Illuminati had a heavy hand in it coming to pass. So how could such a magnificent researcher as Dan Brown fail to include them in his Grail plot???

I’m glad you asked.

The answer, of course, is that Dan Brown IS an Illuminati (“Illuminatus”?)! Just as the actor playing “Chef” on South Park was happy to disrespect every major religion and race until the show had some fun with Christian Scientists, Dan Brown isn’t going to tip his hand and put the spotlight on the Illuminati - the true force behind all of world history and beyond. Duhhh!

But then I thought to myself: “Self, isn’t this a bit too easy?” I mean, c’mon – this would be like Michael Jackson crusading against all crimes against children except sleeping with them. No – there must be something else going on here. Then I considered the format of the book. Virtually everything in the book is not what it seems – pictures are messages, numbers are maps, men are women, truths are lies, authorial integrity is grandstanding crap, names are . . . anagrams. Anagrams. Was this the hidden key that unlocked the door containing the vault wherein lay the footlocker holding the briefcase securing the envelope sealed around the paper that revealed the mystery?

So as I zipped up I mentally listed all possible anagrams of Dan Brown. While I stared vaguely into the swirling bowel it hit me: Dan Brown . . . Bran . . . Down . . . DOWN BRAN. Good Lord, could it be that simple?

No.

Or could it?

Yes.

"Bran Down." Bran is down. A simple Google search confirmed what virtually all scientists and serious scholars already know – the world is facing a bran crisis of epic proportions. Just look at the cost of cereal over the years. Has it gone up or down? Up of course! Why? Supply and demand of course. Less supply equals more demand which equals higher prices - of course. I am now 100% convinced that the Illuminati are somehow affecting the world Bran production in their overall plot to rule the world (even more than they already do).

Oh sure – gas prices tripling in the last year SEEM to be the big issue. Think again. These are merely smokescreens to cover up the more insidious rise of Bran prices. Think I’m wrong? Try this simple experiment: how much did you pay for your last gallon of gas? You can probably guess to the nearest nickel, but can you tell me how much your last box of Raisin Bran or muffin mix cost? I doubt it.

So while we are rallying to have congress do something about gas prices, and promoting gas boycott days, we blissfully and ignorantly and stupidly continue to pay whatever price is asked for Bran or Bran related products.

And the Illuminati are laughing all the way to the banks. Which they own.

Geometry Puzzle

2006-05-07T12:26:00.000-07:00

Does anyone out there know how to solve this puzzle? My friends and I are completely stumped by it.

Both the triangles are exactly the same size. The four portions are exactly the same size. How is it then, that when they are moved around, there is an extra square "hole" that appears?

Unlocking the secret Hebrew of the mind

2006-04-25T07:30:00.000-07:00

A lady wanted me to double check the following report from this blog. (and wouldn't you know it is a blog which all moldy Thomists check daily):

In the shocker of all shockers, Tom Cruise isn't the linguistic expert he claims to be. Despite telling everybody Suri means "princess" in Hebrew, Hebrew linguists have confirmed that it doesn't. Suri has only two meanings - one is a person from Syria and the other "go away" when addressed to a female.

Hebrew expert Jonathan Went says, "I think it's fair to say they have made a mistake here. There are variations of the way the Hebrew name for princess is spelt but I have never seen it this way." Suri can also be translated into a Hindi boy's name, and it also means "pointy nose" in some Indian dialects and "pickpocket" in Japanese.

...He's gonna have to name his next kid "degenerate puppy killer" or something.

So, for the record, I confirm that suri does mean "Syrian", and can also mean "go away" to a girl.

But I am no Hebrew expert either: We just figured it was the secret "Scientology" dialect.

The Logical Relationship Between Faith and Works

2006-04-20T12:10:00.000-07:00

Among Christians and non-Christians alike there continues to be confusion over the relationship between faith and works. In many cases I think this stems from a basic misunderstanding of cause and effect. In this post I would like to briefly describe the relationship using basic logic.

In logic a distinction is made between "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions. Simply stated, a necessary condition is one which must be present for a thing to be the case (but does not guarantee it), and a sufficient condition is one which, by itself, guarantees that a thing be the case. For example, one must be female to be pregnant, but there are non-pregnant females. So being female is necessary for pregnancy, but does not guarantee it. Pregnancy is sufficient for femaleness, however, because only females can be pregnant.

In logical terms this relation can be expressed in the hypothetical phrase "If P then Q" (symbolically, "P>Q"). In this equation P is the sufficient condition and Q is the necessary. This can be demonstrated using the above example. It is clear that "if female then pregnant" is false, for there are non-pregnant females, but it is true that "if pregnant then female." So the relation between two terms is only correctly stated when the necessary and sufficient conditions are in their correct place.

Concerning faith and works we see from Ephesians 2:8-10 that:

For by grace you are saved through faith, and this is not from
yourselves, it is the gift of God; it is not from works, so that no
one can boast. For we are his workmanship, having been created in Christ Jesus
for good works that God prepared beforehand so we may do them. (NET)

Thus, it is clear that faith is the instrumental cause of salvation (what we are saved through)and that good works are the effect of salvation (what we are saved for), and an effect cannot be its own cause. However, confusion arises in James 2:14-22 when he states:

What good is it, my brothers and sisters, if someone claims to
have faith but does not have works? Can this kind of faith save him? . . . faith,
if it does not have works, is dead being by itself. . . . would you
like evidence, you empty fellow, that faith without works is useless? Was not
Abraham our father justified by works when he offered Isaac his son on the altar?
You see that his faith was working together with his works and his
faith was perfected by works. (NET)

Those who see James as contradicting Paul here miss a very important point - Abraham was already affirmed in his faith by the time he offered his son Isaac (see Heb. 11:8-20). While Paul is stressing that faith alone saves - it is for good works. Thus, what James indicates is that faith that is alone is a worthless faith because it is not achieving the end to which it is oriented. James contrasts mere assent (which even demons have) with true, saving faith - one that will have good works as its result.

So it seems then that the proper way to understand this relation is that faith is the sufficient condition for good works (Thus, "If F then W"). Faith guarantees good works, but good works do not guarantee faith (for one can do "good works" without having faith).

Now, it might seem that if faith has good works as a result then we ought to be able to evaluate someone's faith by their good works. Alas, this is not the case. In a hypothetical syllogism (see below) there are only two valid forms: in order to arrive at a sound conclusion one can either affirm the antecedent ("F") or deny the consequent ("W") - neither works vice-versa. So, for example, in the arguments above one could not validly conclude faith ("F") from good works ("W") for this would be committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

F > W
F
= W

or

F > W
~W
=~F

However, can one validly conclude lack of faith (~F) from lack of good works (~W)? Logically, yes - practically, no. There are two difficulties. The first is that we are not privy to the entire life of a person so we may simply be ignorant of their good works. But even if we had access to one's entire life we are not given a biblical standard for the amount, quality, or frequency of these good works. Theoretically even one good work would satisfy the equation (indeed James' illustration of Abraham included only one). I think the most we can say is that when examining our own lives we can be pretty sure that zero good works are indicative of the kind of "faith" James is attacking - but we must be careful in how we judge others.

Lack of any Peer Reviewed Publication of Evolutionary Articles Keeps Naturalism Stuck in the Primordial Soup.

2006-03-26T09:30:00.000-08:00

After exhaustively reviewing some of the worlds major peer reviewed journal publications such as The Journal of Christian Apologetics, Philosophia Christi, Faith and Philosophy, and Bibliotheca Sacra, I found that there is hardly an instant where evolutionary articles (from a purely naturalistic point of view) regarding science, sociology, or philosophy have received any publication worthy of note (other than an article here or there for the purpose of critical analysis). Neither these prestigious journals, nor outstanding peer reviewed blogsites such as UncommonDescent.com, IDTheFuture.com, or EvolutionNews.org, have seen fit to publish any work at length from the naturalistic/evolutionist camp (for any reason other than critical analysis, anyways).

If evolutionists want the Intelligent Design community to start thinking that naturalistic-evolution is viable scientific theory, then much publication in the aforementioned peer reviewed literature must be achieved by the evolutionary scholars in order for that kind of acceptance to take place. Until then, naturalistic evolution will be seen as just a fringe player in the general scheme of scientific inquiry and would be better off just calling a tow-truck to assist them in emerging from the primordial ooze in which they are stuck.

(That is, unless they can come up with a plausible pathway from that primordial goo, to the zoo, to you---that is testable and verifiable.)

Like they say...publish or perish.

Moreland on Universals and Existence part 1

2006-03-18T07:12:00.000-08:00

Moreland on Abstract Objects and Existence

Moreland’s view of abstract objects treats all aspects of a thing as though they are things in themselves. The red in a chair, for example, is itself a thing (property-instance) that is composed of other things. Hence, everything is composed of increasingly primitive things, and this continues until an ultimate primitive is discovered that accounts for the existence of itself and all other things. This may be likened to the materialist view of the world. While the materialist holds that the objects of our experience are composed of small fundamental units called atoms, Moreland holds that the objects of our experience are fundamentally composed of metaphysical things.

For Moreland the primitive building blocks of existence are the universal, the bare particular and the exemplification relation which is both a constituent in the thing made and the unifier of that which is made. The most difficult entity to grasp is the exemplification relation. Difficulty in understanding this entity arises from the fact that it is supposedly a constituent in a property-instance, while simultaneously being a transcendent entity which brings the other two entities together. One may almost think of the exemplification relation as a sort of universal. For the ability to be in a thing and above a thing at the same time is exactly the function and character of a universal.

Existence as a Universal

Moreland’s view ultimately makes existence itself a universal. He strongly believes that being is a genus. For him, being must be a genus because when existence is predicated of a thing, it must mean the same thing in every predication. His description of existence sounds very much like the description of a universal. On his account, being is identical with existence and existence as such is a multiply repeatable entity. What is more, existence is always the same thing in all of its instances and it is the entity which accounts for identity among numerically different instances. These descriptions are identical to his description of universals.

This is not an uncommon criticism of the contemporary realist’s position. Nominalists sometimes claim that the realist notion of existence entails that it be a universal. They then point out that the realist has simply added another universal to account for existence. Realist’s see that adding another universal to account for existence leads to a vicious infinite regress. There are several versions of infinite regress arguments. One of them deals with the fact that universals have no causal power. Universals require something else to instantiate them. If existence itself is a universal, it would require something else to instantiate it. However, the realist does not have any other ontological entities to account for existence. They simply posit a modified universal
and argue that no vicious regress is necessary so long as the lowest order universal is selfexemplifying.

This tactic appears to fail. If existence is a universal, then existence as such is the lowest order universal. It is like all other lower order universals in that it contains higher order universals. On the other hand, existence is unlike other universals in that it is the only self-exemplifying universal. It must be self-exemplifying in order to avoid the infinite regress arguments leveled against contemporary realists. All other universals require existence in order to bring about concrete realities. Existence, however, does not require any other entity to account for its existence.

In this way, Moreland hopes to avoid not only the infinite regress problem, but also the problem posed by Immanuel Kant. Moreland agrees with Kant in thinking that existence cannot simply be a “normal property like redness”. However, in his attempts to avoid Kant’s criticism he ultimately ends up describing existence in terms of its genus and specific difference. Existence for Moreland is a universal, but it is unlike other universals in that it is self-exemplifying. However, if existence is a “self-exemplifying universal”, then existence becomes a fully determinate being. Existence as such is both that which is determinable and that which is determinate.

However, this leads to a contradictory state of affairs. It is contradictory to say that a being is both determinable and determinate at the same time and the same sense. Moreland may respond by claiming that it is simply the nature of existence to be both a thing in itself and to be in other things as a constituent of them. However, this will not do. Unlike many contemporary criticisms of Moreland’s view, this criticism does not charge Moreland with a “strange” view of existence; rather it claims that the view is contradictory and therefore necessarily false.

Existence as a “What”

Another problem arises when one holds that to be real is to be a thing. For this is what is entailed when Moreland describes existence as “the having of properties”. In their book Being and God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being and to Natural Theology, George Klubertanz and Maurice Holloway explain the problem in construing existence in this way. If existence is the being this or that sort of thing, then “there is no effective way to distinguish between a real thing in the proper sense of the word and an essence or a possible thing.” In other words, if all things “are” by virtue of their having properties, and if existence adds nothing to the “what” of a thing, then how does knowing what a thing is inform you of whether or not a thing is?

Moreland attempts to maintain a real difference between essence and existence. He also wants to maintain that a being is more than a sum of its properties. For him, existence is something a thing has in addition to its properties. However, this distinction is blurred by his definition of existence itself. This is because universals account for the “what” of a thing while existence accounts for the “fact” of a thing. However, if Moreland’s view of existence ultimately entails that to exist is to be a “what”, and if existence itself is ultimately a “what”, then the distinction between essence and existence is blurred at best and destroyed at worst.

The Existence of Chuck Norris

2006-02-10T04:58:00.000-08:00

Objection 1. It seems that Chuck Norris does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "Chuck Norris roundhouse kick" means that it is infinite painfulness. If, therefore, Chuck Norris existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore Chuck Norris does not exist.

On the contrary, It is said of Chuck Norris: "He hath counted to infinity - twice." (www.chucknorrisfacts.com)

I answer that, the existence of Chuck Norris can be proved in five ways . . .

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world roundhouse kicks are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of Chuck Norris’ enemy from actuality to potentiality. But nothing can be reduced from actuality to potentiality, except by something in a state of actuality. Therefore, roundhouse kicks must be put in motion by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first kicker, and, consequently, no kicked. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first kicker, kicked by no other; and this everyone understands to be Chuck Norris.

The second way is from the nature of the roundhouse kick. In the world of bar fights we find there is an order of roundhouse kicks. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a roundhouse kick is found to be able to hurt Chuck Norris; for so it would be kicking himself (resulting in the destruction of Chuck Norris), which is impossible. Now in roundhouse kicks it is not possible to go on to infinity, because the universe cannot contain more than one Chuck Norris. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no Chuck Norris, there will be no ultimate roundhouse kick, nor any intermediate roundhouse kick, nor anyone’s butt to receive the kick; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first roundhouse kicker, to which everyone gives the name of Chuck Norris.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be roundhouse kicked and not to be, since they are found to be angering Chuck Norris and not angering Chuck Norris, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to be being roundhouse kicked, for that which is possible not to be roundhouse kicked at some time is not being roundhouse kicked. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be roundhouse kicked, then at one time there could have been nothing being roundhouse kicked. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing being roundhouse kicked, because that which does not get roundhouse kicked only begins to be roundhouse kicked by something already existing. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own roundhouse kickedness, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity (and pain). This all men speak of as Chuck Norris.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in roundhouse kicks. Among roundhouse kicks there are some more and some less good, true, noble and painful. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being roundhouse kicked; and this we call Chuck Norris.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with the ability to kick its butt. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom these things are directed to their end; and this being we call Chuck Norris.

Reply to Objection 1. As Chuck Norris says: "I don't step on toes, I step on necks!” Since Chuck Norris is the hardest kicker, he would not allow any evil to exist unless his roundhouse kicks were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite badassness of Chuck Norris: that he should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good – the good of having something to roundhouse kick.

Highly Effective Ways to Argue Theism #106 :The "I've Written on this Topic Elsewhere" Argument

2006-02-06T20:43:00.000-08:00

I will now present a completely undeniable argument that proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that God exits.

I’ve written exhaustively on this very topic elsewhere.

Therefore, God exists

J.P. Moreland and Metaphysics

2006-02-04T20:02:00.000-08:00

I would love to get some feedback from the moldy thomists of Tu Quoque. J.P. Moreland holds to a univocal view of being. His reasoning for this may be summarized as:

1. Being is either univocal or equivocal.
2. Being is not equivocal.
3. Therefore being is univocal.

Of course our first response is to deny the first premise because there is a third alternative, namely that being is analogical. Dr. Moreland holds that the analogical view is contradictory and he bases this on the principle of identity. According to Moreland, the analogical view holds that there are different levels of existence. By this I think he means that the analogical view holds that things can "sort of" exist. For example, somethings partially exist while other things have full existence. Moreland states, "Something either does or does not have being and everything either has or does not have being." I could be wrong, but I think what he calls the "modes of being" view is an attempt to express the view of us moldy thomists.

So without an analogical option, we are left with a univocal view of being or an equivocal view. Obviously an equivocal view is absurd, therefore we are left with the univocal view. When we say that "Joebob exists" and "My Isuzu Rodeo exists" we are saying the same thing of Joebob and my Isuzu Rodeo. None of us think that "exists" in the first instance means something entirely different from the "exists" of the second instance. And given the fact that a thing either exists or does not exist, it follows that being is univocal.

I don't know how many of you have read "Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview" but for those of you who have, I would love to hear your thoughts on Morelands treatment of ontology in general and on the univocity of being in particular.

Moreland also defines existence as follows:

"Existence is either the belonging of some property or the being belonged to by a property or, more simply, the entering into the nexus of exemplification."

He elaborates saying:

"Consider the statement 'Tigers exist.' This would appear to assert the following: (1) The property of being a tiger (2) belongs to something (an individual tiger, say Tony) ... The claim that tigers exist is the claim that the essence of being a tiger (the what of being a tiger) is actually exemplified by or belongs to something (the that or fact of an individual tiger existing)."

Honestly, I do not get this. I understand the terms and have something of a basic understanding of the metaphysical background here, but to define existence as "the entering into the nexus of exemplification" appears to be riddled with problems. In order for something to enter into a nexus of exemplification doesn't there have to be a "nexus" to enter into? Does this nexus exist? If so, did the nexus enter into the nexus of exemplification? If the nexus does not exist, then how is it meaningful to talk about "something" existing by virtue of its entering into "nothing"?

I would love to discuss this more and bounce some criticisms of this view off of someone. I would be particularly interested in bouncing some idea's off of someone that holds this view.

Old Contributor To Tu Quoque

2006-01-13T14:02:00.000-08:00

After what has been a very long fall, I am finally able to get back into the swing of things. My schedule has lightened up a bit and I will now have time to post some thoughts once again. Just to catch you up, I have finished my studies at SES (for now anyway) and currently reside in Baltimore where I am teaching High School and taking the necessary steps to apply for a PhD. Program. Unfortunately my schedule and living circumstances - no internet connection at home right now (long story) and blogs are blocked where I work - I have not been able to participate in the conversations. I am really looking forward to mixing it up and helping the mold to spread throughout cyberspace. Hopefully I will have something meaningful up in the next few days. Look for the paper on the Ethics of Star Wars that I promised a while back and some shorter segments on Divine Simplicity. Glad to be back.

M. Hipsley . And here is the rest of it.

God’s Knowledge of Time and Human Freedom

2006-01-11T22:50:00.000-08:00

How God knows time plays an integral part in how His knowledge of time (i.e. the future) affects our freedom. For instance, granting that God is infallible in His knowledge of the future, i.e. God knows that A (John mows his lawn on July 4, 2007) will occur since A’s occurring is true, [1] then how can this be the case and yet man (i.e. John freely choosing to do otherwise) still have freedom?

Richard Sorabji makes mention of this problem in light of certain assertions from Boethius regarding God’s knowledge of time. Sorabji states, “there is a powerful reason in Boethius for wanting God’s knowledge to be timeless. Only so, he argues, can we avoid the knowledge in advance which would restrict our freedom? For if we make God’s knowledge of our doings to be both infallible and existent in advance, then what he foresees as happening will have been inevitable all along.” Thus Sorabji concludes, “It is then doubtful that we can either morally or responsibly be free.” [2]

Therefore, the question remains, how does God know time? Furthermore, how does God’s knowledge of the future maintain freedom in man? Or is man simply not free?

There is an exclusive and ultimate disjunction between the timeless and the temporal. However, there is a connection, though not ontologically, between an eternal being (God) and a temporal being (man). It seems implicit in the created order that since successions (i.e. temporal occurrences of successive moments of time) occur, God in some way must understand, comprehend, and know these successions. However, according to the classical philosopher and theologian (e.g. Aquinas, Augustine, Boethius, et. al), God Himself is not in time and thus is not affected by the temporal order. Therefore, the classical philosopher and theologian concludes that epistemologically, all things are present to God with regard to the whole of time and creation; although, all things are not actually present (i.e. in the present tense) in the world metaphysically.

Though God’s knowledge does not undergo succession, as does the reality of creation in its existence, God, nonetheless, in His eternal epistemic foundation, understands succession via the reality He Himself has assigned to creation. Albeit, this assigned reality has in no way caused God’s knowledge to be in succession, since this would place created reality before God’s knowledge, thus becoming the cause of what God knows. This distinction is crucial to our understanding of how God does and can relate and act in and upon the created order. He must in some fashion understand this succession without being affected by it if He is to remain timeless (and especially immutable).

[1] What is meant by declaring that A’s occurring is true is simply that A is the proposition, for example, ‘John will mow his lawn on July 4, 2007,’ and in our granting that God’s knowledge of the future is infallible, then granting that God knows that A will occur is true, then it is inevitable that A will occur; if in fact A did not occur then God’s knowledge of A would be otherwise. Simply put, God would not have knowledge of A since the latter option (A’s not occurring) would be false.

[2] Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 254. Emphasis is Sorabji’s. Sorabji alludes to Boethius work The Consolation of Philosophy, 5.6. Sorabji seems to conclude that if Boethius is correct and “God’s knowledge of our doings is to be both infallible and existent in advance, then what he foresees as happening will have been inevitable all along,” then men would not be free since this knowledge leads to an inevitable conclusion based solely on God’s knowledge (i.e. men could not do otherwise). Sorabji addresses this issue in his book titled Necessity, Cause, and Blame (London, N.P., 1980), 112-13.Here is the beginning of my post.

On the Soul and the Afterlife: A Comparison and Contrast Between the Views of Plato and Aristotle

2005-12-11T06:16:00.000-08:00

The purpose of this writing is to present a comparison and contrast between the views of Plato and Aristotle on the soul and its relationship to the afterlife. A straightforward manor of procedure will be followed in order to accomplish this task. First, the views of these two ancients on the existence of the soul and its relationship to the body will be presented. Then, a comparison and contrast of the two psychologies will be explored in an effort to search out the pertinent similarities and differences between them. Also, the views of Plato and Aristotle on the relationship of the soul to the afterlife will be analyzed and a further comparison and contrast between the two philosophers presented on the post-life destination of the soul. And, in conclusion, a summary of the information contained in the body of this paper will be provided and a brief mention made of the tremendous influence that Plato and Aristotle have had on the history of philosophy pertaining to the soul and the afterlife.

Plato’s View of the Soul

Plato (427-347 B. C.) was a student of Socrates and was one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived. He is well known for taking much of the philosophical work that was done before his time and developing it, along with his own prolific thoughts, into some of the greatest works ever done in the history of philosophy. One of the topics that he wrote on extensively was the nature and existence of the human soul. In his overall psychology, Plato showed much advancement over the pre-Socratics who reduced the soul merely to air or fire or atoms. Plato was neither a materialist nor epiphenominalist, but an uncompromising spiritualist regarding the soul. And, he held to the doctrine of psychological dualism when it came to the relationship between the soul and the body. Basically, Plato held that the soul and the body were two completely distinct substances that merely interacted with each other during the course of a person’s life. He also held that the soul is man’s most valuable possession, and the true tendance of the soul must be its chief concern. (1) In the Laws (896a 1-2) Plato defines the soul as "self initiating motion" or the "source of motion." This being so, the soul is prior to the body in the sense that it is superior to the body, the latter being moved without being the source of motion, and he also held that the soul must rule the body.(2) Although he often referred to the interacting relationship between the soul and the body of an individual, Plato put a weighty emphasis on the soul as being the prominent aspect of the human being. In fact, Plato held that the soul is actually who a person is and that the soul is basically just trapped in the body, waiting to be released from its material grasp. This is evident in the Laws where Plato states, "What makes each of us to be what we are is only the soul." (XII, 959)

Although Plato does present such a heavy emphases on the soul throughout his writings, he does not deny the influence that may be exercised on the soul by or through the body. In the Republic he includes physical training among the constituents of true education, and he rejects certain types of music because of the deleterious effect they have on the soul. Even though Plato does speak on occasion that the soul merely dwelt in the body and used it, we must not represent him as denying any interaction of soul and body on one another. Plato may not have explained interaction in great detail, but this is a most difficult thing to accomplish in psychology in its own right and it is evident that he at least held to some level of interaction between the substances of soul and body, even though it may have been in a very minimal sense.

All that being said, it will now be useful to go into further detail on some more technical aspects of Plato’s psychology. The most pointed presentation of Plato’s view of the soul can be found in one of his greatest works, the Republic. The basic plan of the Republic is to draw a systematic analogy between the operation of society as a whole and the life of any individual human being. Basically, Plato supposed that people exhibit the same features, preform the same functions, and embody the same virtues that city-states do. Applying the analogy in this way presumes that each of us, like the state, is a complex whole made up of several distinct parts, each of which has its own proper role. Plato argued that there is ample evidence of this in our everyday experience. When faced with choices about what to do, we commonly feel a tug of contrary impulses drawing us in different directions at once, and the most natural explanation for this phenomenon is to distinguish between the distinct elements of ourselves (Republic, 436b).(3)

What is put forth in the Republic is the teaching of the tripartite nature of the soul (Gk. psyche), a doctrine that is said to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans.(4) According to Plato, there are three kinds of soul.(5) First, there is the rational soul, which he represented as located in the head. Next, there is the spirited soul, which is located in the breast. And, finally, there is the appetitive soul which is located in the abdomen.(6) The first type is immortal and only exists in humans. The second kind is present in brute animals. And, the third kind is present in plants.(7) Furthermore, according to Plato, the rational soul (mind or intellect) is the thinking portion within each of us, which discerns what is real and not merely apparent, judges what is true and what is false, and wisely makes the rational decisions in accordance with which human life is most properly lived. The spirited soul (will or volition), on the other hand, is the active portion; its function is to carry out the dictates of reason in practical life, courageously doing whatever the intellect has determined to do best. And, the appetitive soul (emotion or desire) is the portion of each of us that wants and feels many things, most of which must be deferred in the face of rational pursuits if we are to achieve a salutary degree of self-control. Plato’s analogy in the Republic basically holds that the physical body corresponds to the land, buildings, and other material resources of a city. There is another analogy in the Republic that teaches that the three souls of the human being directly correspond to the three classes of citizen within the state, each of them contributing in its own way to its successful operation.(8)

In the Phaedrus, Plato presented his theory even more graphically, comparing the rational soul to a charioteer whose vehicle is drawn by two horses, one powerful but unruly (desire) and the other disciplined and obedient (will). On Plato’s view, then, a human being is properly said to be just when the three souls preform their proper functions in harmony with each other, working in consonance for the good of the person as a whole–with the rational soul thinking properly (resulting in wisdom); the spirited soul willing what is good (creating courage); and, the appetitive soul feeling in a proper sense (resulting in moderation). Plato’s main intention here is evidently the ethical interest of insisting on the right of the rational element to rule, to act as the charioteer.(9) It is in an analogous sense that this applies to the ethics of Plato and his theory of the just-state. That is, the proper balance of these souls in the individuals of a given state would result in a just-state as a whole. In the very same way that the individual soul is analogous to the just-state, the just-state relates to the particular soul in that an individual man has many different faculties and functions within himself (such as the state contains within its boarders) and it is the harmony of these functions that leads to a virtuous life. A life of virtue is the ultimate goal of Plato’s psychology when it is applied in a practical sense.

Aristotle’s View of the Soul

Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) was a student of Plato and has been of equal magnitude in laying the foundations for the rest of the history of philosophy to build upon. In regards to his emphasis on the study of psychology, Aristotle was adamant to point out the importance of an investigation concerning the soul as he held that it was the vital principle of all living things.(10) Aristotle’s view of the soul stems directly from his view of metaphysics, and he uses his familiar form/matter distinction to answer the question "What is a soul?" At the beginning of De Anima (II.1) he says that there are three sorts of substance that exist, e.g., matter (potentiality), form (actuality), and the compound of matter and form. Aristotle is interested in compounds that are alive and it is these types of compounds, e.g. plants and animals, that are the things that have souls, and, their souls are what make them living things. Furthermore, since form is what makes matter a "this," the soul is the form of a living thing. (Not its shape, but its actuality, that in virtue of which it is the kind of living thing that it is). As Fredrick Copleston explains:

The composite substance, says Aristotle, is a natural body endowed with life, the principle of this body being called the soul. Body cannot be soul, for the body is not life but what has life. . . . The body then, must be as matter to the soul, while the soul is as form or act to the body. Hence Aristotle in his definition of the soul, speaks of it and the entelachy or act of the body that possesses life in potency–‘potentiality of life,’ as he remarks, not referring to a thing which has been dispossessed of soul, but to that which possesses it. The soul is thus the realization of the body and is inseparable from it.(11)

Before moving any further, it will be important to review the general causality of Aristotle in order to better understand the foundations of his psychology. This is due to the fact that the notions of form and matter (which his psychology is based on) are themselves developed within the context of a general theory of causation and explanation which appears in one guise or another in all of Aristotle’s mature works. According to his theory, when we wish to explain what there is to know, for example, about a bronze statue, a complete account consists of at least the following four factors– (1) the statue’s matter, (2) its form or structure, (3) the agent responsible for that matter manifesting its form or structure, and (4) the purpose for which the matter was made to realize that form or structure. These four factors comprise the four causes of Aristotle:

(1) Formal Cause (that by which something comes to be)
(2) Efficient Cause (that through which something comes to be)
(3) Material Cause (that out of which something comes to be)
(4) Final Cause (that for which something comes to be)(12)

The respective applications of these causes to the bronze statue are as follows: (1) its material cause is the bronze itself, (2) its efficient cause is the sculptor, insofar as he forces the bronze into shape, (3) the formal cause is the idea of the completed statue, and (4) the final cause is the idea of the statue as it prompts the sculptor to act on the bronze. With these tenants in mind, the soul is, in accordance with Aristotle’s causality, the cause and principle of the living body insofar as it functions (a) as source of movement, (b) as final cause, and (c) as the real substance (i.e. formal cause) of animate bodies.(13)

Aristotle’s Hylomorphic Soul/Body Unity

So, when Aristotle introduces the soul as the form of the body, and, in turn, that the body is the matter of the soul, he is doing so in a way that would be similar to the relationship of the form of a statue of Hermes made out of certain kind of matter, such as bronze.(14) On this account, although the soul is not a material object, it is not separable from the body. According to Aristotle, " . . . the soul does not exist without the body. For it is not a body, but something which belongs to a body, and for this reason exists in a body, and in a body of such-and-such a kind" (DA. 414a 20ff.). This position held by Aristotle is what is known as Hylomorphism–that the soul and body are one composite substance, or, in other words, one hylomorphic soul/body unity. The word Hylomorphism is simply a compound word composed of the Greek terms for matter (hule) and form or shape (morphe); thus, one could equally describe Aristotle’s view of body and soul as an instance of his "matter-formism." The position of Aristotle on the soul’s relationship to the body is as intrinsic as the relationship between an impression made in wax and the wax itself. In short, one cannot be had without the other. Both body and soul must be present to make up the one substance of an individual person.

Although there is the seemingly undeniable doctrine of an inseparable soul/body unity in Aristotle’s psychology, there are some further considerations that need to be stated in order to understand the full orb of his position and to better compare it with the psychology of Plato (as I intend to do later). As a provision for a fuller understanding of his position, Sir David Ross introduces these following distinctions regarding the "inseparable" nature of soul and body in Aristotle:

. . . the word ‘inseparable’ here needs carful consideration. Soul and Body, like form and matter in general, are in a sense separable. The matter which is now linked with a soul to form a living thing existed before the union began and will exist after it ceases. It is only from form, not from this form, that this matter is inseparable. And again this form can exist apart from this matter. For in Aristotle’s view it is one form that is embodied in all the members of species, and it can exist independently of any one member though not of all. It requires for its existence, therefore, not this matter but this kind of matter. It requires a body with a certain kind of chemical constitution and a certain shape, and it cannot exist embodied in another kind of body.(15)

What Ross is pointing out here opens a window of deeper insight into Aristotle’s psychology. It seems as though Aristotle held that there was a kind of universal unity between the collective form of soulness in general and the totality of the related physical matter as a whole. And, this universal unity was transcendent of the particular soul/body unity that took its particular form/matter existence in individual living things. It’s as though there is a general, universal form/matter unity that finds its nest in the individual soul/body unity of a particular living thing–with the particular, individual soul/body unity being inseparable throughout the finite duration of the living thing and the universal form/matter unity being inseparable for an eternal amount of time.(16) These distinctions put forth by Ross are not only helpful in understanding the deeper metaphysical implications of Aristotle’s psychology, but also bring forth some distinctions that will be helpful in the comparison between Plato and Aristotle on the afterlife.

Grades of Actuality and Potentiality

Based on these foundational aspects of form and matter that comprise the soul/body unity in humans are the more technical aspects of Aristotle’s psychology. These further details are explained in the many distinctions that he puts forth in De Anima regarding various grades of actuality and potentiality that exist within the soul. In his psychology, Aristotle distinguishes between two levels of actuality (Gk. entelechia). He gives knowing and attending as examples of these two kinds of actuality, which have become traditionally referred to as first and second actuality, respectively (DA 412a11). In another place he elaborates this further and adds one more example, that of being asleep vs. being awake (DA 412a22-26), but, he does not fully clarify this important distinction until later on in the De Anima (DA II.5 417a20-30). Furthermore, it is not until even later in the corpus that Aristotle makes further clarification and says that there are different types of both potentiality and actuality, and his explanation concerns different ways in which someone might be described as a knower (DA 417a20).

For example, one might be called a knower in the sense that he or she, (1) is a human being, (2) has grammatical knowledge, and (3) is attending to something. Furthermore, a knower in sense (1) is someone with a mere potential to know something, but no actual knowledge (not everything has this potential, of course, e.g. a rock or an earthworm has no such potential). A knower in sense (2) has some actual knowledge (for example, she may know that it is ungrammatical to say "with John and I"), even though she is not thinking about it right now. And, a knower in sense (3) is actually exercising her knowledge (for example, she thinks "that’s ungrammatical" when she hears someone say "with John and I").(17) It is important to note a key distinction here in that (2) involves both actuality and potentiality. In other words, the knower in the sense (2) actually knows something, but that actual knowledge is itself just a potentiality to think certain thoughts or perform certain actions.(18) So, with that much in focus we can now describe our three knowers in this way–(1) first potentiality, (2) second potentiality (= first actuality), and (3) second actuality.

Here are some illustrations developed by S. Marc Cohen that might help bring further clarification to the distinctions of actuality and potentiality in Aristotle’s view:

(1) First potentiality: A child who does not speak French
(2) Second potentiality (first actuality): A (silent) adult who speaks French (3) Second actuality: An adult speaking (or actively understanding) French

An applicable explanation of these illustrations is as follows: a child (unlike a rock or earthworm) can (learn to) speak french. A Frenchman (unlike a French infant, and unlike most Americans) can actually speak French, even though he is silent for the moment. And, someone who is actually speaking French is, of course, the paradigm case of a French speaker. Aristotle uses this notion of first actuality (the silent french-speaking adult) in his definition of the soul, "The soul is the first actuality of a natural body that is potentially alive" (412a27). Remember that first actuality is a kind of potentiality, or, put another way, it is a capacity to engage in the activity which is corresponding to the second actuality. So, with this in mind, we now understand that a soul is put forth by Aristotle as a capacity of a living thing. But, that being said, the question still remains– the soul is a capacity, "but a capacity to do what?"(19)

In answer to this question, a living thing’s soul is its capacity to engage in the activities that are characteristic of living things of its natural kind. But, yet another question arises, "What are those activities?" In De Anima (II.1; II.2) Aristotle provides some examples, such as: self-nourishment, growth, decay, movement and rest (in respect of place), and perception and intellect. So, according to Aristotle, anything that nourishes itself, that grows, decays, moves about (on its own, not just when moved by something else), perceives, or thinks is alive. And, the capacities of a thing in virtue of which it does these things constitute its soul. In other words, the soul is what is causally responsible for the animate behavior (i.e. the life activities) of a living thing.(20)

It is also important to note that Aristotle posited various degrees of soul in his system of psychology. Basically, there is a nested hierarchy of soul functions or activities (413a23) that give us three corresponding degrees of soul. The hierarchy of soul functions are:

(1) Growth, nutrition, and reproduction
(2) Locomotion and perception
(3) Intellect (= thought)

Additionally, the three corresponding degrees of soul are:

(1) Nutritive soul (plants)
(2) Sensitive soul (all animals)
(3) Rational soul (human beings)

These are nested in the sense that anything that has a higher degree of soul also has all of the lower degrees. All living things grow, nourish themselves, and reproduce. Animals not only do that, but move and perceive. Humans do all of the above and reason as well. There are further subdivisions within the various levels, but this much will suffice for the task at hand. For now, it is just important to remember that the soul is a capacity that enables a life form to perform its necessary actions and functions. The soul is Aristotle’s source of movement in living things.

Similarities/Differences

Overall, it can be said that Aristotle’s view on the soul is somewhat of an empiricist reaction to the rationalism of Plato. I say this in relation to how Plato’s epistemology related to his view on the soul. Plato held that to come to know something through sense perception was to recollect a priori knowledge that was possessed in the pre-existence as a form in the mind. Although it is evident that Aristotle was adhering to similar doctrines of Plato while he was still under his direct influence, it is equally as evident that Aristotle drastically changed his views later on and provided somewhat of a counter argument against Plato’s position.(21) Where Plato posited a priori recollection of eternal forms from the pre-existence, Aristotle, in his mature works, posited a temporal soul/body unity, free of pre-existence, that possessed a tabula rasa (i.e. blank slate) that comes to knowledge through sense perception of the physical world. So, at least at this level, the two philosophers seem to be in diametric opposition to one another.

But, upon further analysis, there appear to be some noteworthy similarities between the psychologies of the two philosophers. First off, neither Plato nor Aristotle were staunch materialists (or functionalists) in their views on the soul. In other words, neither of them denied the existence of souls in human beings by reducing thought to mere functions of matter. They both believed in the existence of souls, and, in the case of humans, that a soul had something to do with ones identity (although Plato put all of identity on the soul, whereas Aristotle did not). Furthermore, they both recognized the importance of studying the existence of the soul and held it as a priority in their philosophical systems. Also, they went to great lengths to delineate different faculties of soul that were of greater and lesser degrees, each recognizing the soul as the source of movement in living things. Although there are some technical differences present, they both show evidence of noticing that there are different degrees of the faculties of soul (e.g. appetites, desires, etc.) present in man and that these faculties were prone to wrestle with one another within the soul. They also both held that it was the ability to reason that set human souls apart from animal and plant souls.

Focusing again on the differences between the two philosophers. Plato was a dualist in that he believed that a human being was comprised of two substances, body and soul, and it was the soul that signified the identity of the particular human. In contrast, Aristotle held that it was a hylomorphic soul/body unity that comprised one substance that signified the individual human being’s identity. Also, Plato believed in the pre-existence of human souls whereas Aristotle (in his mature works) denied such a doctrine. For Plato, the soul was a thing that represented an eternal, pre-existent life form, and, for Aristotle, the soul was only an immaterial, temporal mover of the physical being–there was no such pre-existence. Another related aspect of Plato’s doctrine worth mention here is that of the transmigration of the soul. This is a view held by Plato that is similar to reincarnation–that there are forms of souls that pre-existed in other material things and will go on to exist in other life forms after death. According to Plato, "Every soul may be said to wear out many bodies, especially in the course of a long life" (Phaedo, 87). This was completely denied by Aristotle and will be further addressed later when the comparison/contrast with Plato on the afterlife is drawn.

Plato’s View on the Afterlife

Plato may be said to have begun from a stock of doctrines on immortality that was largely prepared for him by Socrates’ interest in Pythagorean views of the soul. In his earliest depictions of Socrates, Plato makes him espouse an unwavering belief in the existence and immortality of at least some gods and a commitment to the soul’s immortality that is more circumspect and critical but no less profound. These early dialogues contain the ideas that the soul is the true locus of personhood, that its welfare is vastly more important than the body’s welfare, and that at least some part of it survives death. Also present are the views that the soul is judged for its actions, that it may be reincarnated (i.e. transmigration), and, that the post-mortem fate of the soul provides reasons to embrace a life of earthly virtue.(22) These core commitments are also maintained throughout the Platonic corpus, long after the composition of the Apology and Crito. The use of afterlife judgement as a further incentive to virtue, along with the theory of psychic immortality it entails, may be found in the Gorgias, Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, Theaetetus and Laws.(23)
Moreover, what Plato added to the views that were held by Socrates (and the pre-Socratics) was not so much new content as a new ambition–an ambition to prove the soul’s immortality. The majority of the dialogues attributed to his middle period, especially the Phaedo, Phaedrus and Republic, include explicit attempts at such proofs. The Phaedo is devoted to this task almost single-mindedly and is structured as a series of such proofs. Most commentators indicate them as follows:

The Opposites Argument 70a–72e. On the analogy of our experience of various rhythmical processes, such as those of expansion and contraction, sleeping and walking, it is urged that the processes of the universe in general are cyclical, or, as Plato puts it, that ‘opposites’ arise from and give birth to one another. In the case of the ‘opposites’ of death and life, we see in experience only one half of the cycle, the process of dying, by which life gives place to death; but on the grounds of analogy it is reasonable to postulate the existence of a corresponding reverse process by which the dead return again to life. In fact, unless there exists such a reverse process, the ultimate fate of the universe must be the entire cessation of life.(24)

The Recollection Argument 73a–77e. Another case for the immortality of the soul is drawn from an argument that stems directly from Plato’s epistemology–according to which knowledge is really a process of ‘recollection’ of truths of which the mind was familiar with in a previous state of existence. This doctrine, if accepted, proves pre-existence, and thus establishes at least the possibility of continued existence of the disembodied soul after death.(25)

The Resemblance Argument 78b–84b. According to Plato, forms and particulars differ systematically. Forms are invisible, unchanging, uniform and eternal, where particulars are visible, changeable, composite and perishable. The human soul is invisible too, and it investigates Forms without the aid of bodily senses. By ruling a particular body it resembles the divine which rules and leads. Thus the soul is ‘most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, and indissoluble.’ Its uniformity and partlessness exempt it from the decomposition that destroys compounded bodies; for all these reasons we may conclude that it is immortal.

In addition, the Phaedrus (245) argues for the soul’s immortality from its essence as a self-mover; what acts as an ultimate source of motion for other things cannot have any beginning, or any end. In the Republic X (609–10) Plato adds the argument that each thing can be destroyed only by its own proper evils–as iron by rust, wood by rot or fire and so on–and if the agents that make it worse do not destroy it, nothing else will. But what makes the soul worse is vice, and this has no tendency to destroy the soul. Thus nothing can destroy the soul, and it is imperishable. Furthermore, the Republic X (611) also argues that the soul’s immortality precludes its having parts. Socrates claims that the complex psychology elaborated in the bulk of the Republic applies to the soul only as it is "maimed by its association with the body" in itself, and, when not incarnate, the soul is partless. Immortality is also attributed only to the partless, purely rational soul in the Timaeus (69), where the lower parts are called "mortal." On the evidence of these three dialogues, then, it seems that immortality is a property only of our rational souls. But the myth in the Phaedrus (247–257) and the Republic’s "Myth of Er" tend to suggest that immortal souls still possess irrational parts even when divorced from bodies. This ambivalence over the simplicity or complexity of the discarnate soul became a point of controversy among later Platonists. Regardless, the general intention here has been to show that Plato went to great lengths to argue for the personal immortality of the soul after death.(26)

Aristotle’s View on the Afterlife

Aristotle did not take up the Platonic project of proving the soul’s immortality or of providing eternal rewards for virtuous conduct. Indeed, by defining the soul as the "first actuality of an organic living body" (De Anima II. 1), he seems to have precluded the possibility that any soul can survive the dissolution of the body whose actuality it is. Two lines of thought complicate this story and seem to make room for some immortal element in the soul. The first is the caveat, stated twice (De Anima I.1 II.1), that the continued existence of any part of the soul in separation form the body is impossible, unless there is some activity of the soul that is not a complex activity of the soul and body–thinking is explicitly offered as a possible example of this, in contrast to such activities as feeling fear or anger, which clearly involve psycho-physical cooperation. The second and related complication is that in his analysis of intellect and intellectual thought in De Anima III 4-5 where Aristotle refers to a mind that is "immortal and eternal" and is somehow involved in human thought. If we connect these two strands together, we may conclude that we have found something like the rational part of an individual human being’s soul and that we are being assured of its immortality. However, another line of interpretation will make this immortal and eternal mind (what later tradition calls the active intellect) a force external to the individual, whether a divinity that may be personal in its own right or a reservoir of impersonal thinking power. On views of this sort, what Aristotle is offering us falls short of anything that might be considered to be the personal immortality of individual human souls.(27)

In brief, Aristotle does not make use of the arguments we found in Plato that a certain form of life is to be preferred because of its consequences in the hereafter. There is no promise of eternal rewards for virtue or caution of eternal judgement for evils. It is true that he argues for the superiority of the life of philosophical contemplation on the grounds that the philosopher will most resemble the gods, be dearest to them, and be most likely to earn their favor (NE X 8). But, it must be understood that these benefits belong only to this life and not the next. Also, when this advocacy of contemplation culminates in the call to "be immortal, to the extent possible" by employing our reason, the divine element in us (NE X 7), there is nothing about the afterlife in this appeal, only a striking shift of meaning–immortality has here become removed from survival after death, or eternal existence, and now simply denotes a kind of activity that a participant may share for finite, even fleeting, periods of time.(28)

Further Comparison and Contrast on the Afterlife

Aristotle’s view of the afterlife is so different than Plato’s that it serves, in itself, as a bold contrast. The aspects previously mentioned are obviously in opposition to Plato’s perspectives on the afterlife. For instance, the transmigration of the soul held by Plato has no place in Aristotle’s psychology. Since, in Aristotle, there is no pre-existent soul, and, the soul only exists in its unity with the body, then, the soul is "over with" when the body dies. There is no soul that goes on from this life and appears in another life to possess another body, and so forth. This life would be the end of the line, according to the Aristotelian position, and this serves as a stark contrast to Plato’s view of a disembodied soul after death and its continued transmigrational journey. Nevertheless, even though these glaring differences are there, it is still possible to dig a little deeper and uncover what are perhaps some subtle similarities between the two views. With that in mind, some of the controversies surrounding certain aspects of Plato and Aristotle will serve well as a springboard for some comparative speculation.

Throughout this writing, we have seen that Aristotle generally denies Plato’s doctrine of an immortal soul. But it is important to remember, as was shown earlier, that, in Aristotle’s system, there seemed to be a general form/matter unity between the universal form of the soul and matter which essentially nested in individual (particular) soul/body life forms. As the quote from Sir David Ross pointed out, this universal unity was transcendent of the particular soul/body unity found in individual humans. So, while this is by no means equal to Plato’s doctrine of an immortal soul, there is, at least, a universal composition that transcends the soul/body unity of an individual life form in Aristotle’s view, even though the extent of the transcendency may be confined to the temporal universe. Although it may be a bit of a stretch here, I see this as a slight similarity between the two positions, in that there is at least an element of general transcendence beyond particular physical life forms to be found in the systems of both philosophers (although the level of transcendence is obviously different).

Moreover, it is in the within the realm of some of the controversial aspects of the two psychologies that a further similarity can be sought. Stemming from the superiority of the faculty of reason held by both philosophers, there is an interpretation of certain passages in Aristotle (as mentioned earlier) that suggest that the faculty of reason in humans had an actual, eternal transcendence to it (insofar as it was part of an eternal, universal-thought) and was something that survived death, ultimately residing outside of the physical universe. Although, this continuance of the faculty of reason falls short of the personal immortality of the soul, it still provides a subtly interesting similarity to Plato. For instance, there is the controversial passage that seems to indicate that Plato denied the immortality of the lower souls and held that it was only the rational soul that lived on after death (Timaeus , 69). Setting the controversial issues surrounding this passage aside for the moment, I see this as alluding to a two-fold similarity between Plato and Aristotle in the sense that there is (1) a strong emphasis on the rational faculty of man that is evident in both psychologies, and (2) that this rational element is pushed to the point of transcendence by both philosophers. Once again, the specific details of the transcendence and its extent are different, but, there are certainly aspects that are found to be similar in this strain of analysis. Of course, this is just some interesting speculation on controversial grounds. But, nevertheless, it provides some relevant food for thought and could be further evidence of Plato’s direct influence on Aristotle carried over into his psychology, that is, if such speculations so happen to be sound.

Conclusion

It has been shown throughout this writing that there is much to be compared and contrasted between the views of Plato and Aristotle on the soul and the afterlife. There are times when the both agree on certain tenants, and other times where they are in total disagreement on specific points. There are comparisons between them insofar as they both believed in the existence of the soul and that it was the source of motion in living things; furthermore, they both believed that the soul had different levels, possessing different faculties, and, that the ability to reason was superior to the rest of the lower faculties of the soul. Conversely, there are some stark contrasts that are evident between the two psychologies. Plato held to pre-existent souls and to a dualistic relationship between the two substances of soul and body, and, it was also rather clear at times in his writings that he held to the personal immortality of the soul. Whereas Aristotle denied the pre-existence of souls, held that the soul was an essential part of a single substance (a hylomorphic soul/body unity), and, he put forth no explicit doctrine of personal immortality. Once again regarding comparisons, deeper investigation uncovered some possible, yet subtle, similarities between the two philosophies. These were regarding the evidence of a minimal transcendent element in Aristotle’s view on the soul and how this at least somewhat compares to Plato’s obvious soul-survival doctrine. Also, in accordance with this line of investigation, an emphasis on the rational element of the soul and its relation to the transcendent element appeared to be held by both philosophers.
All of these kinds of similarities and differences between these two magnificents are to be expected, though. The similarities are there because Plato was one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived, and Aristotle was his prized pupil who was directly influenced by him in these specific matters. The differences between them are to be anticipated because Aristotle was a great thinker in his own right, and when he was no longer under Plato’s direct tutelage, he sought to critique, analyze, and develop Plato’s teaching on the soul as well as incorporate many of his own prolific thoughts into the development of his very own psychology. Incredibly, the works on the soul by both of these philosophical giants have greatly influenced the entire history of psychology and the major tenants of their views are held in diverse forms by many philosophers to this very day.

In conclusion, I must say that I do depart from Plato’s substance dualism view of the relationship between the body and soul and that I side with Aristotle on his one substance hylomorphic soul/body unity view. Although, I must add that I find Aristotle’s view on the afterlife as desperately wanting and I at least side with Plato (in a minimal sense) in that I agree there is a personal afterlife in which the individual human soul definitely participates. Although the works on the soul by Plato and Aristotle are very exhaustive and certainly prolific, both of these views as they were presented in their time are worthy of some serious critique and are in need of much further development. This was a task that was brilliantly performed centuries later by Thomas Aquinas, but, the Thomistic syntheses of Plato and Aristotle on the soul is a matter worthy of an entire writing in its own right–perhaps at another time.

Notes:
1. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 207.
2. Ibid.
3.Gary Kemerling, Plato: The State and the Soul (Iowa: Philosophy Pages, 2002), 07.
4.Copleston, History of Philosophy, 207.
5.Plato held, in general, that these three "different souls" were not materially different and were intrinsically linked.
6.Joseph Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1959), 233.
7.Ibid.
8.Kemerling, The State and the Soul, 07.
9.Copleston, History of Philosophy, 210.
10.Ibid., 325.
11.Ibid., 327.
12.Mortimer J. Adler, Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.), 42.
13.Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 328.
14.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 11-15-05.
15.Sir David Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen and Co. LTD, 1964), 132.
16.Aristotle held to the existence of an eternal universe and eternal matter.
17.S. Marc Cohen, Aristotle on the Soul (Washington: University of Washington, 2000), 04.
18.Ibid.
19.Ibid.
20.Ibid.
21.Copelston, A History of Philosophy, 347.
22.Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Plato, Accessed 11-15-05.
23.Ibid. [The Republic’s vindication of the just life in no way depends on eternal rewards, but after that vindication is complete, book X mentions them as an additional consideration.]
24.A.E. Taylor, The Mind of Plato (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1969), 85.
25.Ibid., 86.
26.It is important to note that Plato almost completely diverted the issue of an afterlife in his later writings. This is probably because he began to see problems fitting the eternal soul in with the rest of his philosophical views.
27.Routledge,
28. Ibid.

Can We Hurt God’s Feelings?

2005-11-18T09:22:00.000-08:00

I remember back when I was first being introduced to the Christian culture I heard a song by Michael W. Smith called “I Miss The Way” concerning someone who had fallen away from the faith. One of the lines is, “Somewhere in the saddest part of heaven’s room our Father sheds a tear for you – He’s missing you too.” It’s a beautiful song, and while it was certainly touching to think of God like that, it always seemed a bit . . . off. I still have a difficult time picturing the all-powerful creator of the universe having to go off into a quiet corner of heaven and have a good cry because one of His creatures doesn’t like Him anymore.

As I grew in my knowledge of God it became even more difficult to accept this rather sappy idea, but it seemed I could not escape it. Through college I kept hearing about how “passionate” God was for me. I even knew a girl who had regular “dates” with Jesus. Sorry, but that just seemed rather creepy. Later I was told that our relation to God was a “sacred romance.” In seminary I thought things might get a bit clearer and was told that God had “unchanging emotions.” This made more sense – metaphysically God cannot change nor be affected, so of course however He feels cannot change or be affected either.

But then someone asked me what it meant for God to have feelings about things that did not affect Him. Hmmmm. Good question. Isn’t that like someone finding me in a bad mood and asking me what made me so mad –to which I answer, “Oh, nothing.” Another good question: Without a body what would it mean for God to have “feelings” in the first place? Double hmmmm. So I turned to The Theologian, St. Tommy himself, and found some interesting stuff that I thought might be of interest to other philosophy geeks.

There are different facets of passions by which we can discover if they may be found in God. First is the source of the passion. In God there can be no passions of sense, for these require a body with which to sense and that can undergo some change (as when our hearts beat faster to produce certain feelings), but God does not have a body, nor does He change. So when we speak of passions in God we are not using the term to mean “feelings” as we often do when ascribing these things to humans. Rather, we are referring to the intellect - the will. In good marriage counseling it is often pointed out that love is a choice more than a feeling – it is thus more properly said of love that it is an operation of the will (viz. the willing of the good of another), than a reaction of the emotions or body.

Second, we can also look at what a given passion is directed toward and in what way that passion is directed to its object. For example, sorrow’s object is some present evil. God cannot be directed toward evil, thus He cannot have sorrow. Joy is the opposite of sorrow for its object is the present good. God can have joy, for He is the ultimate good to which He is directed and in which He has joy. Hope is in relation to a good that is not present. Because God is directed to His own good, which is ever present, God cannot have hope. Fear, the opposite of hope, is relating to a non-present but threatening evil. Fear cannot be found in God then, Who cannot be threatened.

Using these metaphysical criteria one may deduce the appropriateness of assigning passions to God. For example, envy, which is sorrow over the good of another, cannot be found in God – not only because it requires sorrow, but it takes the good of another as being evil – and this confusion is not present in God. Anger, which is the willing of the evil of another due to sorrow over injury, cannot be found in God for it too requires sorrow and the willing of evil which God cannot do (in fact, if God were to will evil of a thing then it would simply not exist). Love, which is the willing of good for another, is not improperly said of God, for He wills the good of Himself and others. Joy and delight are properly attributed to God, for both require that one finds rest in a present good – which is God in Himself. Hatred, which is the willing of the evil of another is not properly said of God, unless one takes hatred to mean the willing of less good (which it often does in Scripture, see Luke 14:26 and Rom. 9:11-13). It is not that God simply wills less good for one than another, rather that the proper good of one is less than the proper good of another.

So what about the Bible passages ascribing the above passions to God? Thomas’ answer is simple: other than love and joy these other passions are said of God metaphorically. Often passions that are attributed to God are done so based on effects that, when considered from a human perspective, would usually indicate the passion’s presence (such as anger resulting in punishment). While it might at first seem merely arbitrary to label some statements in Scripture as metaphor and others as proper truths, we must remember that all metaphors require some prior knowledge of a thing’s essence in order to properly communicate. Thus, one’s prior metaphysical beliefs will determine how one takes these descriptions of God (for if they are all taken literally contradictions would result, see Num. 23:19 cf. Ex. 32:14). So in the end it is really more a matter of whose metaphysical system is most correct.

Can't We All Just Get Along?

2005-11-16T18:06:00.000-08:00

Well, it seems safe to say that the ID vs. Evolution debate isn't going to go away. As time keeps ticking, the issue seems to be gaining more and more attention in the public square.

So, since neither ID nor evolution seem to be disappearing, what I would like to see take place in the next phase of things is . . . . well . . . both sides working together for a common good.

What I am hoping for is that a committee will form that consists of both prominent ID scholars and prominent evolutionists (and, of course, the necessary legal council from both sides, as well).

And, what I would like to see form from this committee is a charter that details all of the reasonable parameters for teaching science--including both Intelligent Design and Evolution.

There is obviously a ton of stuff that needs to be discussed regarding this notion. But, in short, I will submit that two basic boundaries need to be implemented, one for each side of the debate.

(1) In the charter, evolution needs to finally come clean. All of the stuff that is being conceded behind closed doors by evolutionists needs to be included in the charter, and, what is bunk in evo teaching needs to be addressed as such, what is mere hypothesis needs to be explained as such, and what is actually being observed as taking place in an evolutionary manor put forth as fact. Any of the standard evolutionary hypotheses concerning origins need to be clarified as being merely "one side of the story."

(2) Also, in the charter, strict boundaries need to be set on Intelligent Design theory as taught in science class in order to avoid sliding into a full Paley. Critiques of evolutionary theory by ID are fair game. Probabilities regarding origins and issues of complexity are good to go (as the other side of the story). But, strict guidelines prohibiting creation science evangelism taking place under the guise of ID must be established, and, some sort of legal line drawn that carries a penalty of some kind if crossed (and in all fairness, no proselytizing into secular humanism, either).

I think that this last stipulation would eliminate the evolutionists fear of religious fundamentalists misusing ID (which is a legitimate fear, mind you) and, it should be made crystal clear that religious questions that arise from inferring design in science class are to be deferred to the Philosophy of Science and Religion classroom, without exception.

Furthermore, the charter could/should also address issues of discrimination against ID that take place at the College and University level. All of the discriminatory bologna that takes place against ID friendly scholars at the hands of evolutionists needs to be addressed, the proper stipulations made, and legal boundaries set with consequences put in place for certain violations.

This will open up the door for any closet IDrs to come out in the ranks because they are normally not willing to surface due to the fear of losing their tenures and so forth. Also, students will have more academic freedom with these guidelines in place as blackballing and unfair treatment by the establishment would be met with a penalty.

In sum, I am obviously putting this forth with my hand heavy towards ID. Many stipulations from the evolution camp would need to be included in the charter, of course. But, it should be understandable that my submission has to be leaning towards the needs of ID, as it is the evolutionists that possess most of the land at this time, and the ball of making concession is in their court.

The $68,000 question in all of this is . . . will the evolutionists be willing to go through the pain of giving up their Gaza strip in the name of peace?

only time will tell.

Fear and Loathing of Metaphysics

2005-11-11T11:45:00.000-08:00

A well-done thought piece on ID and theism was opposed and critiqued by one of our beloved constant commenters. In any case, it brought to mind a quote that I thought I would reproduce here. Etienne Gilson was writing about the universal knowledge aimed at by metaphysics, why Kant got it wrong, and why we should not be afraid because of him.

Theology, logic, physics, biology, psychology, sociology, economics, are fully competent to solve their own problems by their own methods; on the other hand, however...as metaphysics aims at transcending all particular knowledge, no particular science is competent either to solve metaphysical problems, or to judge their metaphysical solutions.

Of course Kant would object that, so far, his own condemnation of metaphysics still holds good, for he never said that metaphysical problems could be solved in that way; he merely said that they could not be solved at all. True, but it is also true that his condemnation of metaphysics was not the consequence of any personal attempt to reach the foundations of metaphysical knowledge. Kant busied himself with questions about metaphysics, but he had no metaphysical interests of his own. Even during the first part of his career there was always some book between this professor and reality. To him, nature was in the books of Newton, and metaphysics in the books of Wolff. Anybody could read it there; Kant himself had read it, and it boiled down to this, that there are three metaphysical principles, or transcendental ideas of pure reason: an immortal soul to unify psychology; freedom to unify the laws of cosmology; and God to unify natural theology. Such, to Kant, was metaphysics; a second-hand knowledge, for which he was no more personally responsible than for the physics of Newton. Before allowing Kant to frighten us away from metaphysics, we should remember that what he knew about it was mere heresay.
--E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience

Whether There Are Causes

2005-11-10T07:35:00.000-08:00

The article that follows is a amateurish attempt to tackle an issue in the style and tradition of Aquinas’ Summa. It asks a general question and then gives objections to thinking that the answer is negative. It then follows the objections with an appeal to some authoritative source and then a brief explanation of the affirmative position. After that comes brief answers to the objections posed. This is a first attempt at this style and it is understood that many things are assumed and remain to be defended and/or explained. But nevertheless, enjoy.

It appears there are not causes, for: Objection. 1: There is nothing incoherent in the idea that something may arise from nothing. Since a causeless beginning can be imagined there is no need for a cause. Objection 2: Further, a first event would need no cause since it is the first, thus there is a cause is unnecessary. Objection 3: The term "causality" is simply a mental construct to allow anticipation of future actions but it is not a real principle. Objection 4: It will be argued that all things that exist need a cause, but then so does the first cause. Objection 5: Even if there were a first cause that cause would not now exist, just as smoke lingers from a fire that is extinguished.

On the contrary: Hume notes "I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that something could arise without a cause" (Hume, The Letters of David Hume, 1:187). The Philosopher, likewise, observes "It is of ultimate causes that we must obtain knowledge, since it is when we think that we have grasped its first cause that we say that we know a thing" (Aristotle, Metaphysics, I. 3. 1).

I answer that: It is altogether repugnant to the intellect to deny there are causes. Nonbeing cannot cause being, for there is nothing to do the causing – nothing comes from nothing. Only being causes being. By definition all effects need a cause, and by cause is meant that which creates an effect. All effects pre-exist in their cause. No effect is greater than its cause. Events are effects and are thus caused. Likewise that which is contingent is caused by another. All change is simply a reduction of potentiality to actuality, but actuality precedes potentiality in the order of being. Therefore, all things that are reduced from potentiality to actuality are done so by that which is already in act. Potentiality simply limits act to the type of act that it is. There are six causes that are ordered to any effect. The efficient cause is that by which something comes to be as a carpenter is the one that builds a chair. The formal cause is that which something is, it is what defines the carpenter’s creation as a chair. The material cause is that of which something is, as wood is of which the chair is made. The final cause is that for which something is, as the chair is made for sitting. The exemplar cause is that after which something is, as the blueprint for making the chair. And the instrumental cause is that through which something is, as tools are used to make the chair. It is through these causes that it can be said that we know something truly.

Reply to Objection 1: I argue it is wholly incoherent to assert that something may arise from nothing. As nothing is neither in act nor potency. Thus, for anything to come into existence there must be something since all change is a reduction of potency to act, but if there is neither, then there is no change or creation. Further that there was nothing followed by something is not incoherent, but that nothing caused or produced something is repulsive to the intellect. Reply to Objection 2: It is unintelligible to assert that a first event needs no cause. An event is an effect by definition, thus to assert an event is uncaused is contradictory. Reply to Objection 3: Causality is a real principle of human knowledge. It is not simply a mental construct. When potentiality is reduced to actuality a real change takes place, not one simply of intellect. It is true that causality allows for anticipation but it is not limited to such an understanding. Reply to Objection 4: I argue not all things that exist need a cause, only those things that begin to exist. As stated above actuality precedes potentiality in the order of being. If there is no thing already in act then no thing can come into existence. If there ever was a time that there was literally nothing, then nothing now would exist. Reply to Objection 5: This analogy confuses effects and after-effects. The smoke lingers because it is being caused to exist by other physical laws. If those physical laws ceased to exist, then so too would the smoke. Likewise, those who rely on a here and now cause for exist-ing always require a cause for there continuing to exist. The continuing to be of here and now things depends on more than physical laws. Every contingent being needs a cause for its moment by moment existence, since its existence is not intrinsic to them. If existence were ever intrinsic to a contingent being, then it would no longer be contingent but necessary. Existence is ordered to act as essence is ordered to potency. Anything that has the potential to not exist is not necessary. Only that being that has no potential to not exist is necessary. It is thus clear that not only are there causes, but by them we can have knowledge.

Flagellar Technology

2005-11-03T09:19:00.000-08:00

Check out this video report on the work done by a team led by Dr. Namba in Japan. Their purpose was to understand and analyze the nano-technology of the bacterial flagellar motor. Their work was reverse engineering. It is a streaming windows media file.

HT: bipod at Telic Thoughts

Stryper! The Yellow and Black Attack is Back!!

2005-10-31T06:29:00.000-08:00

Last night at the Neighborhood Theater in Charlotte, North Carolina I was treated to a . . . well . . . a Christian Metal Fest Extravaganza!!!! At the anointed hands of none other than STRYPER!

Yes, that's right, I was fortunate enough to have a great balcony seat for the Stryper show and enjoyed an entire 80s metal ensemble, complete with arena style drumming, muddy bass guitar, high pitched vocals, and dueling lead guitar action---the whole nine yards of heavy metal motion was on display last night, and it was a sight for sore eyes and ears!!

I was an avid metal-head in the 80s in a time when I was not walking with the Lord. I was so into the music (and the subsequent Hedonism and Satanic content) at the time that it was best for me to take a break from that genre of music post conversion. But, after 6 years straight of listening to cheap Christian "mall-rock" I was starving and needed a severe dose of metal madness.

Stryper provided that and much, much more for me at the show. They opened up with a couple of new songs, then went chronologically with hits from "Yellow and Black Attack" and "Soldiers" etc. and played a couple more new ones to round out the show. Then they came back after a short break with an encore of "To Hell With The Devil" to close things up. Their musicianship is great and they rock out in the name of the Lord, handing out Stryper versions of the New Testament (along with guitar picks and drumsticks) and Michael Sweet even closed the night in prayer! Stellar!!!!

Stryper is currently on tour (as a follow up to their previous reunion tour) supporting their new album "Reborn" (which is actually great) and it is a show well worth catching. For more information, go to the official Stryper website at: http://www.stryper.com/index.html

The Mid Semester Lull

2005-10-28T11:13:00.000-07:00

Ah yes, another nice lull in posting here at the moldies. I know that my excuse is . . . well . . . mid terms of course. But, my mid terms are now over . . . which means that finals will be here soon. Regardless, I feel the desire to blog something, so here goes.

I have been reflecting a lot lately. Thinking about the task/discipline of philosophy in general. The analogy of a medical practicioner always comes to mind. I ponder "do people in the medical profession learn intricate details about human biology and medicine so they can be talking heads at parties, talking about cardiology etc.? Or, do they learn the stuff to be of service to people with the fruits of their learning?"

I think, in a perfect world, anyways, that the latter would (should) be the case.

The analogy applies in my mind, so should the end of the philosophical task be, to help people in some in some positive way or capacity. As a medical practicioner would desire to help someone with a physical ailment, so should a philosophically minded individual seek to help people who might have, lets say, metaphysical problems--or something along those lines.

This is certainly not an attempt to sound pious here (I am far from the aforementioned mark), but it seems as though this should be at least part of the goal--an attempt to be a good steward of thought and a servant to others in a philosophical capacity.

In a nutshell, my musings as of late seem to have the same bottom line. Selling out to the process of philosophical inquiry, and doing so in the Spirit of our Lord. What a mark, indeed, and one that I am sure to fall terribly short of. But, I at least hope to die facing in the direction of these stipulations.

Keep up the good work soldiers. The spoils of eternity are well worth the temporal battle.

Moral Knowledge via Connaturality

2005-09-30T20:59:00.000-07:00

Christians often appeal to God as the ultimate ontological basis for moral values, but less is said about the epistemological basis for moral knowledge. It is sometimes suggested that we have a set of innate moral first principles. Others say that moral knowledge is instilled in us by way of our upbringing and that moral knowledge may be refined by comparing our moral beliefs with the beliefs of society. Both of these accounts are lacking. The former is not helpful in explaining the variety of moral sentiments, while the latter is not helpful in establishing an objective morality.

Jacques Maritain's notion of moral knowledge via Connaturality (or by way of natural inclination) appears to alleviate the above problems. It is not that we have an innate knowledge of moral principles, rather we have a natural inclination toward moral action and judgment. This incliniation may be refined or distorted. It may be refined by a good upbringing and a reflective character, or it may be distorted by a poor upbringing and an uninteresting character.

In support of this view is the universal fact of moral judgment. We may grant the fact that various cultures differ in their normative prescriptions. However, we are still left with the fact that all cultures have some sort of normative standards. If it is the case that action flows from a things nature or essence, then it would appear that man is by nature a moral being. He cannot help but condemn wrong action and praise noble actions. Even if he is confused about the moral rightness or wrongness of a particular action, he is not ignorant of the fact that there are right and wrong actions.

What then is the immediate epistemological grounds of our moral knowledge? Man is. Our nature cannot help but tend toward some sort of morality. Philosophy's primary task is not to justify the objectivity of morality, rather its job is to reflect on and elucidate the principles inherent in the nature of man. Of course as Christians, this is not enough. This is rather the beginning point for our inquiry into the study of morality. Ultimately, there must have been a Cause of our essence who pointed our nature in a particular direction. That Cause is God.

Any thoughts? Criticisms? Has anyone here read anything by Maritain on Natural Law?

Hours of Panda Blasting Fun: The New Panda-Monium Video Game

2005-09-23T11:40:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

The new Panda-Monium is here!!

Enjoy hours of manning the wheel of the "Dembski Dozer" and firing rounds at flying pandas as they scream "who designed the designer?" when they are hit.

You can play Panda-Monium here
http://www.uncommondescent.com/darwinalia/panda-monium.swf

When arguments become lovefests

2005-09-16T14:26:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Science

Here is one of a few discussion forum threads about Intelligent Design that I started: Is there such a thing as a testable and falsifiable ID theory?

Said and done, it seems we agreed to disagree in a sea of tentativeness, and suprisingly high levels of kindness abounded (that is, for the internet). It became a study in itself about the way 'social' interactions can work over such controversial topics as ID. You can see how people explain themselves, how people respond to questions, how people want to be viewed...all in all, the thread became a rather Socratic experience for me. Bear in mind that the anti-ID people who stayed with it were ostensibly scientists (Joe in physics, Peter in paleontology, Brandon in cell biology), and we few pro-ID people weren't so much geared that way. Whether that is typical or not doesn't really matter. I love stuff like this. I welcome comments, and many avenues weren't fully persued from the discussion.

One Liners and Mixed Metaphors

2005-09-16T12:21:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

These one liners and mixed metaphors are courtesy of Dr. Richard G. Howe. His website is at http://members.mailaka.net/richardghowe/

One Liners

I didn't know that ignorance was not an excuse.

Maybe I shouldn't second guess myself after all.

I have given up the observance of Lent.

Can you think of a question with the word 'cantaloupe' in it for no apparent reason?

If you give in to one slippery slope fallacy, pretty soon you'll be giving into them all.

I'm the only one here who is not unique.

Life is either an excluded middle or it isn't.

The word 'practically' had practically come to mean virtually the same thing as the word 'virtually.'

Ask me about my vow of silence. (with thanks to Doug Beaumont!)

If you like your job, are you a gruntled employee?

Everybody overgeneralizes.

Sometimes it's intermittent and sometimes it's not. (with thanks to Sonny Fleming!)

What if there were no hypotheticals?

In this business, you either sink or swim or you don't.

Surveys show that nine out of ten people say that if you get ten people together one person is always going to disagree with the other nine. (Colin Mochrie)

A rough-coated, dough-faced, thoughtful ploughman strode through the streets of Scarborough and, after falling into a slough, he coughed and hiccoughed.

Can you be a closet claustrophobic?

Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you.

Just because you're a hypochondriac doesn't mean you're not seriously ill.

This is a once in a lifetime opportunity that only comes every so often. (Randy Moss)

Mixed Metaphors

We'll burn that bridge when we get to it.

We need to lower the playing field.

I wouldn't do that for a ten foot pole.

I wouldn't touch that with a million dollars.

He's a little green behind the ears.

We've just begun to scratch the iceberg.

I don't mean to be chasing a dead horse.

If you do that you'll open a whole ball of wax.

Everyone here is on the seat of his pants! [CNN reporter during the Florida presidental election fiasco]

That just tickled the pink out of me [with thanks to Joan Solheim].

I don't mean to throw a monkey into the wrench. [radio talk show host]

I don't mean to step on anyone's sacred cow … [radio preacher]

He was running around like a chicken with its legs cut off.

You don't have to be a rocket surgeon to figure that out.

Reductio Ad Conclusion

2005-09-15T13:16:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

I think it's time for some new informal fallacies . . .
It is fun to watch struggling new logicians and theologians attempting to refute thinkers who are, while wrong, still pretty darn smart (see the Dodecohedron of Opposition elsewhere on this blog). Now I am a neophyte as well in this area but I have seen some funnies that I think are worthy of a cool latin title.

For example, the other day I was discussing a certain highly respected theologian's view of God, time, and simplicity with a colleague. He was recounting a conversation he had with a student regarding the fact that if one accepts that God is in time they must also believe that God is not simple. The student was valiantly trying to use a reductio ad absurdum type argument to show that God being in time results in the absrud conclusion that He is not simple. But that is the theologian's own position! Thus, the student actually reduced the theologian's argument down to his own conclusion.

We decided to call this "Reductio Ad Conclusion" - the fallacy of reducing your opponent's conclusion to his conclusion.

It's a fine start, so please help add to the list and maybe we can get a freakin book published.

How to Beg the Question

2005-09-15T13:04:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

(This is a re-post of an article that was lost in the great purge of '05)

This is a pet peeve of mine that I hope to solve beginning here. I am constantly hearing the expression "this begs the question . . . " on radio and TV and it is almost always used incorrectly. Begging the question is not simply raising a question. For example, if I see a car for sale that looks great but only costs $14.95 it does not beg the question "What is wrong with that car?" (although that is certainly a question that should be asked).

So for you non-logic-nerds out there, here is what this phrase means: To beg the question is a technical phrase in logic that refers to someone inserting the conclusion of an argument into the support for the conclusion. Thus, it "begs the very question" under discussion. For example, suppose that you and I are arguing over whether or not Star Wars is the greatest movie of all time and I give the following argument:

1. Whatever has nothing better than itself is the greatest.
2. There is no better movie than Star Wars.
3. Therefore Star Wars is the greatest movie.

The argument is valid (its conclusion follows necessarily from its premises), however I have sneaked in the conclusion that I was arguing for into premise 2 - thus, I have "begged the question." This is a fallacy and makes the argument faulty.

Ahhh. I feel better now.

Hollywood Idiocy

2005-09-15T12:58:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Culture

(This is a re-post of an article that was lost in the great purge of '05)

Since tu quoque has "culture" as part of its emphasis I thought I'd make my first post in line with one of my passions - movies. It seems that Hollywood has made itself a new enemy: Movie Sanitizers. It all started with TV Guardian - a product that automatically muted foul language based on a program's closed captioning and replaced the profanity with a cleaned up version of the audio in text form on the screen.
Now you can buy movies that have been edited by private companies, or purchase hardware that removes it for you. In 2000, Ray Lines created CleanFlicks, a Utah based video sanitizing company, that cuts nudity, sex, violence, and bad language from movies. CleanFlicks then records and sells the edited films to consumers for about $12-$17 depending on the amount of work involved to clean the film up. CleanFilms provides essentially the same service. Another company, ClearPlay, does not change the original movie, but instead provides hardware/software that skips flagged scenes based on the viewer's preselected choices.

In this article I wish to expose the faulty thinking of Hollywood on this issue. It is one thing to say that a particular action should not be done (such as enjoying bad music), and another to say it is unethical or illegal. Whether or not movie sanitization is "wrong" in the first sense is up for debate (my thoughts on this aspect are presented at the conclusion). Whether or not it is unethical or illegal is the focus of this writing.

What's the Issue?

Members of the DGA (Director's Guild of America) have begun an outcry against this practice, what they consider to be illegal, or at least immoral, tampering with their work. These “e-rated” (for “everyone” or “edited”) movies, they claim, violate federal copyright law. The sanitizers say the practice is protected by the law's “fair use” provisions (such as allowing parodies to be made without the original director's intent). Indeed, what the sanitizers are doing is not all that different from studios creating edited versions of movies for TV or airline flights. The directors answer that those changes are made with the directors’ permission and are true to their original intent for the film. To issue these e-versions with the director and studio's name is unethical.

From the Sanitizer's POV

Sanitizers argue that they have created a market for Hollywood that it would have otherwise lost. ClearPlay does not change the studio version, instead it merely creates electronic flags on certain scenes. Again, those who would never purchase a non-edit might now do so. Sanitizers say they are simply meeting a market need. Studies consistently show that the majority of Americans think movies are too violent / sexual and would like to have the ability to view the films with these elements taken out. Hollywood can produce whatever it wants under the First Amendment, and individuals can personally edit what Hollywood produces under that same Amendment. So long as these edits are not misrepresented as original works then copyright law is not violated. If this is the case then selling these edits is not illegal or immoral either.

From the Director's POV

The challenge to this practice is based on the fact that a screenwriter’s story, a director’s vision, or an actor’s art is the intellectual property of that person. To tamper with it is to change it into something its creator never intended. Members of the DGA were scandalized by what they consider to be poor editing and the destruction of their creation. Legally, the DGA can argue that Clean Flicks' business amounts to a violation of copyright laws. Or that this practice violates trademarks by using the studio's name on a product the studio did not make. This might also involve the charge of false advertising if the editing results in a substantially different product. This could extend to those involved in the films as well since anyone whose name is used for commercial purposes has the right to control the use of their name and image.

Analysis of Arguments

Money

It's not about money - and few people seem to argue that it is, although it is often the first thing that comes to mind because, despite the evidence to the contrary, many are still convinced that Hollywood is just giving people what they want in order to make more money. Sanitizers are quick to point out that they are not robbing anyone of income - in fact they are increasing it by creating a market that the original movie would have missed out on. When CleanFlicks sells a copy of one of their sanitized movies the consumer is also sent a non-edited copy. Thus, for every sanitized DVD CleanFlicks sells, a corresponding non-edited DVD is also sold. These directors are not concerned over income loss - otherwise they would produce more family-friendly pictures that have historically generated more money than non-family-friendly movies.

Copyright Infringement

The facts seem to indicate that what these companies are doing does indeed fall under the Fair Use Act. Parodies, for example, do not require authorial consent to be protected from copyright infringement. Individuals may make edited movies on their own, and so long as they possess a copy of the original it is legal. Thus, so is selling said edits (along with the original).

The Copyright Office has testified that ClearPlay does not violate U.S. copyright laws either. This should be obvious, since ClearPlay technology does not alter the original film in any way. ClearPlay acts as a sort of "preset" fast forward or mute button, rather than creating an edited version of the movie. In fact, a new bill makes this explicit. The Family Movie Act may soon be passed into law protecting technology like ClearPlay's in order to help parents keep children from unwanted content.

Freedom of Speech

The claim that sanitization is a violation of the director's First Amendment Right is simply absurd. There would not be a sanitized version of a film if the director had not already been allowed to produce the original. Further, disallowing anyone from editing what they watch may very well be a violation of the First Amendment which includes protections from indiscretion. People clearly have the right to censure what they watch, and simply because a company is providing prepackaged censured versions of films does not change that fact.

False Advertising

The idea that directors/studios do not want their names associated with these sanitized films would be more legitimate if it was not done all the time for other reasons (e.g. airlines and television). Further, those who own a sanitized film are well aware that it has been edited. That's the whole point! The idea that people will credit the director with a bad film based on the edited version is rather ungracious. Besides, these directors obviously do not care about this particular audience anyway since they continue to make violent, sex-filled movies despite their proven unpopularity in the overall market.

Ratings and "Adult Oriented" Films

Hollywood directors seem to be altogether ignorant when they miss the point that this is not simply an issue of parental consent. They argue that parents should have an active role in determining what their children watch (which is true), and that this is the purpose of ratings (which is often a joke). However, it is not this simple. This is an individual moral question of whether or not certain material should be viewed regardless of one's age. Hollywood seems to think that once one reaches adulthood that offensive elements magically become acceptable (thus the euphemism used to refer to pornography as "adult films"). This leads to the next objection.

Who Decides?

One common objection to this process is that sanitizers are deciding what people should and should not watch. How, it might be asked, is this any different than what the directors are doing? They seem to think that what they create is what people want to see. The popularity of the sanitizing business indicates that they are in fact wrong in many situations. Studios playing the ratings game also have control over content - the existence of "uncut and unrated" versions bear testimony to this fact. All sanitization does is provide additional options (and isn't Hollywood all about pro-choice???). So why is it only the "moralists" who are being attacked? Perhaps the sanitizers should respond to Hollywood the way its members often respond to pro-lifers: "If you don't want a sanitized movie, don't get one."

As far as the actual editing decisions, it is a somewhat subjective process of course. In fact, different companies base their editing on very different standards. CleanFlicks and CleanFilms edit the kind of material most conservative moviegoers (religious or not) might find objectionable (such as sexuality, cussing, gore, violence). Another company, FamilyFlix, also edits out religiously offensive material (such as using titles of deity as curse words), homosexuality, inappropriate dress, crude humor, sexual innuendoes, alcohol and drug content, etc. and won't even edit films with objectionable themes. Thus, people now have more content choices than ever!

Turning the Tables

Some directors have asked, "Why not take all the sex and violence out of the Bible or Shakespeare?" This only reveals their ignorance of the world outside Hollywood, because this already takes place. Children's Bibles do not include such stories, and Cliff's Notes are well known for the violence they do to the texts they summarize. This does not make the process right, but it does show that originals do not lose value just because alternate versions exist.

Artistic Integrity

It should be noted at the outset that very few movies are the creation of a single source. The very existence of "Director's Cuts," "Unrated / Uncut Editions," and "Extended Versions" argue for this fact. Few directors are given carte blanche with regard to their films. The final product is a collaboration between the producer, studio, director, screenwriter, editors, actors, etc. In fact, there is even a title (auteur) given to directors who have gained enough control to be considered the primary source for a film. All of that to say this: the DGA's claim that editing their work is to destroy it are being somewhat whiny and dishonest about the actual process that led to "their" creations.

The fact is that many people make decisions about the "vision" of a film besides the director - and this often massively affects the final product. In fact, this is a large enough issue that official DGA policy has been enacted to address the situation. When directors believe that they have lost control of a project, and are so unhappy with the result that they no longer wish to be associated with it, they may appeal to the DGA to have their directorial credit listed as "Alan Smithee" (an anagram for "The Alias Men", and the only permissible pseudonym for a director).
Further, even if it were true that these sanitized films rob a given movie of its original intent, beauty, intensity, sexiness, or whatever - so what? If someone is truly concerned about these things they probably wouldn't watch the sanitized version in the first place. At least this gives people a choice (which is, ironically, the paramount ethical consideration in most liberal dialogues).

Finally, this position is incredibly hypocritical! Screenwriters and directors are constantly "adapting" books into movies without authorial input (or, in some cases, the author's approval - such as the case of Roald Dahl and the 1971 version of Willy Wonka). Why aren't these directors concerned about authorial intent when revising other people's visions? Within Hollywood itself countless "remakes" and "re-imaginings" of older films are done all the time - often without any attention being called, or credit given, to the original. It is widely known that these remakes almost never live up to the originals, yet no one complains about it except fans.

Creative Credit and Ego Issues

As a writer and musician I understand that creators do not like any secondhand distortion of their creation. Admittedly, this is often closely related to ego issues - credit is difficult to assess in a situation where the creator cannot claim sole responsibility. The main issue, as I see it, is that these directors want to be celebrated for their creations and can't seem to deal with the fact that the majority of moviegoers wish they had done it differently.

A case in point happened shortly after the release of Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom Menace in 1999. There was almost universal disapproval of the character Jar-Jar Binks. This created a demand in the market that was met by some clever folks with video editing software who released a new version of the film (variously referred to as The Phantom Edit and Episode I.I) with Jar-Jar and some other spurious material edited out. It quickly became more popular with many fans than the original. Director/Writer George Lucas (who himself has created several controversial edits of his own) was surprisingly non-outraged.

"Armchair Directors" have always existed of course, but never before have they been able to publicly do something about it. I believe it is an affront to some director's egos that others think they can "do it better than they can", and the popularity of their reedits is causing the directorial outcry. Most of the attitude seems to revolve around the directors' annoyance with "some amateur" messing with "their vision." However, if these amateurs were not producing something that literally millions of consumers are willing to pay extra money for it is doubtful that it would ever have become such an issue.

Conclusion

Reediting is no more immoral than hip-hop music sampling, cover tunes, parodies, Cliff's Notes, or paraphrases. Certainly these kinds of works do not reflect a high level of artistic quality, and only the original work should be considered when evaluating the director (or writer, or actors, or studio, etc.), but to consider this kind of work immoral or illegal is simply special pleading.*
Personally, I try to get as close to the director's vision as possible. I will almost always choose the Extended / Unrated / Uncut / Director's Cut versions of any movie I wish to see in order to best evaluate what the movie's creator(s) had in mind. Personally, I would not invest in edited movies because I believe that style elements should not be universally categorized as right or wrong without considering their intended effect. However, I would certainly consider making user-controlled filtering technology available for times when I did wish to remove objectionable elements in order to accommodate more sensitive viewers (not that I find de-sensitivity an admirable character trait, mind you).

The main problem I have with this whole thing is that rather than sanitizing Hollywood, Christians should simply make better movies themselves. For most of the Church's existence it led the way in the arts (and sciences, and philosophy . . . ). The expectation that the world will be better at producing these things is extremely new on the scene. But we (Christians) have sacrificed significance for style, and cultural relevance for cheap "gospel messages." Even in this fallen world, quality is what counts (as films like The Passion of the Christ have demonstrated). So long as artistic garbage like Left Behind is offered as the pinnacle of Christian creativity we will have little to complain about when it comes to Hollywood's popularity.

* "Special Pleading" is an argumentative fallacy in which a person applies standards to others while exempting himself without good cause.

www.christianmovieevaluations.org

why is everyone scared of beauty?

2005-09-09T08:31:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

"we fly to beauty as an asylum from the terrors of finite nature." - emerson.

beauty ought to be a source of security and hope, yet it appears everyone is scared of it.

just because it's objective doesn't mean it's scary.

beautiful assumptions

2005-09-05T16:32:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

most people have heard or used the expression, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." but only a few dare to question the validity of such a statement that seems so obvious at first glance. i refer to this statement as an unquestioned assumption. this statement, if i may be permitted to speak in general terms, assumes an idealist metaphysic. the idea behind it is that something is beautiful based on the idea of beauty already in the mind of the onlooker, hence, beauty is wholeheartedly subjective. however, maybe it is possible that the form of the object in extra-mental reality contains certain universal standards that render an object beautiful regardless of who likes it. in the current debate on beauty, the idea of taste and beauty have been used basically a synonyms. i think a distinction needs to be made between these two terms. beauty relates to the objective qualities of an object, whereas, taste corresponds to one's feelings and experience of the object. therefore, something which is beautiful does not have to be liked by everyone, and something that is ugly does not have to be despised by everyone either. regardless, of whether people agree with me on all of these issues, i still think it is time to question the notion that beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Best Possible World Scenarios

2005-09-03T18:29:00.000-07:00

Posted in:Humor

Over the course of the history of philosophy and theology, there have been skeptics who have challenged Classical Theism with various *Best Possible World Scenarios*

Some of these challenges have been rather mild (e.g. Couldn't have God created a world without evil?) and some a bit more rigorous (e.g. Couldn't have God created a world where everyone freely chose to do good? ala Flew). Regardless of the intensity of these challenges, someone of the Christian faith has always risen to the occasion and provided a good answer to the proposed possible world.

But, I think that Classical Theism may be in trouble this time. I believe that I have unfortunately come across a better possible world that God could have freely chosen to create that will go unanswered . . .

I mean, God could have created a world where everyone had a Mullet . . .

. . .Where the only sport that ever took place was NASCAR . . .

. . . and the only beverage that was available to sustain life was Budweiser

Alright SES Students and Tuquoque friends! Will someone boldly step up in the spirit of Aquinas and please refute this purported superior possible world, defend our actual world in contrast to this mullet/nascar/budweiser hypotheses, and subsequently save the day for Classical Theism!!

This post dedicated to the state of North Carolina. Represent!!

The Flying Spaghetti Monster

2005-09-03T17:31:00.000-07:00

Posted in:Humor,
Science

Sometimes you just have to give the opposition (e.g. Evo-Devos) credit for coming up with something rather creative and funny.

For more on the The Flying Spaghetti Monster go here

Here is another that is rather funny too http://www.berkeleybreathed.com/images/NipplesGRAB.jpg

A 5 Step Program of Recovery for Logical Positivists

2005-09-01T14:41:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

1. Logical Positivism holds that all meaningful statements have to either be varified by the five senses or they are true by definition

2. Premise (1) cannot be varified by the five senses nor is it true by definition

3. Therefore, Premise (1) is meaningless.

4. But Premise (1) is Logical Positivism.

5. Therefore, according to Logical Postivism, Logical Postivism is meaningless.

Evolutionists Anonymous: A 12 Step Program for Those who Suffer from Methodological Naturalism

2005-08-31T20:20:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

The following 12 steps have worked for those of us who were previously suffering from the bondage of evolutionary theory. If you happen to be suffering as we once were, we suggest that you give them a try.

1. We admitted we were powerless over Evolutionary Theory and that our research in the various fields of science had become horrendously unfruitful as a result.

2. Came to the valid inference that an Intelligent Cause much greater than time, chance, and natural processes was responsible for the fine-tuning of the universe and complexity in biology. And we understood that such a postulate could restore us to scientific integrity.

3. Made a decision to turn our efforts and research over to the duty of detecting specified complexity in nature as it was placed by an Intelligent Cause and committed ourselves to leaving specific questions about said Cause open for later philosophical discussion.

4. Made a searching and fearless inventory of our scientific methods and our previous dogmatic, antisupernatural biases.

5. Admitted to an unspecified designer, to ourselves, and to another scientist the exact nature of our errors.

6. Were entirely ready commit to a robust ID research program in an effort to make amends for years of methodological naturalism.

7. Humbly asked the unspecified designer to remove our naturalistic presuppositions.

8. Made a list of all ID theorists we had publically slandered, and became willing to make amends to them all.

9. Made public amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would jeopardize their tenure, research grants, or hopes for a fair dissertation examination.

10. Continued to take inventory of our scientific methodology and when we were wrong promptly admitted it.

11. Sought through hypotheses, testing, and experimentation to improve our ability to detect design in nature, hoping only for a better understanding of irreducibly complex biological systems and for research grants to further such investigation.

12. Having been set free from dogmatic methodological naturalism as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to other suffering evolutionists whenever possible, and to practice these basic ID postulates in all of our scientific affairs to the best of our ability.

Although these previous 12 steps are only a suggestion, they have been incredibly successful in helping many a confused, depressed, and hopeless scientist break free from the bondage of macro-evolution and subsequently live a life of complete scientific satisfaction and integrity . . . one day at a time.

ID Falsifiability ala Behe

2005-08-29T19:13:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Science

"ID says that intelligence is needed to make complex functional structures. So ID predicts that random mutation and natural seelction won't be able to do so. If a Darwinist showed that mutation/selection could make impressive, complex, functional systems, ID would be falsified."

--Mike Behe

[For more on the falsifiability of ID, see the article by my friend Casey Luskin at http://www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/846 ]

Dembski and the "shark-jumping" Evolutionists

2005-08-27T10:32:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Science

Dr. Dembski has a cool post in regards to how evolutionists may have finally "jumped the shark" in thier efforts to thwart the ID movement.

This enjoyable post can be seen here http://www.uncommondescent.com/index.php/archives/278

And I highly suggest you check it out if you desire to find out what "jumping the shark" actually is.

Enjoy

A Call to Arms

2005-08-09T06:42:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Science

There was a recent request submitted to SES for some help over at a science chat forum which can be found at the respective URL www.sciencechatforum.com

Word has it that the only critic of evolution there is a directed panspermeist. Some ID perspective would be useful over there, I am sure ;)

I am going to venture on over to the site and see if I can help. Please join me if you so desire.

Thanks!

Highly Effective Ways to Argue Theism: Dada Apologetics

2005-08-06T22:06:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

In the spirit of postmodernism, one needs to adapt to the changing needs of the modern day unbeliever. Let’s face it, classical apologetics is dead (it’s all rational and stuff). Frankly, nobody has the time to think critically on these issues. Thankfully, there’s a way to share ones faith with the staunchest critic and leave them speechless every time. Born out of the Dada movement in poetry and art comes Dada apologetics!

Let’s say your dialoging with Al Atheist. Al Atheist says, “I simply cannot believe that a God exists that would allow such gratuitous evil in the world.” How would you respond? Knowing that an actually thoughtful answer is useless, you turn to the Dada apologetic method. Now, ideally you would want to choose a book at random, but in the spirit of apologetics let’s simply stick with one book about apologetics. For this example I’m using Geisler’s Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (it’s the largest book on the topic). I will randomly flip the pages and stop whenever the mood strikes me. Then I’ll blindly finger out a word on the open page in front of me. Repeat this process until the sentence is complete. But how many words should I keep my sentence to? Sentences can vary quite a bit in length, so I’ll randomly say twenty words (not including definite and indefinite articles like a, an, as, of, and the). Let’s return to the conversation, shall we?

Al Atheist: “I simply cannot believe that a God exists that would allow such gratuitous evil in the world.”

Cory Christian: “Kinds skepticism a confirmation of ministry spanned predictions identified as the cosmos cited contradiction passages a sense of self-stultifying the formally example basis of James speak as perfection though.”

Al Atheist: “Wow! That’s amazing. It’s like...it’s like you knew exactly what I needed to hear. I’m dropping my atheism right now!”

See how easy it is? We didn’t need to bother with actually answering Al Atheist’s...er...Al Allelujah’s statement with facts or reason. This method bypasses the mind and goes directly to the heart. Granted, it can be a bit cumbersome and time consuming to pull out a book and finger words when talking face to face. That’s why I suggest one carry around about 100 5x7 cards with pre-made Dada apologetic sentences written on them. Imagine how you’ll woo the crowds with your mind-boggling command apologetic material. This method is so easy and effective it won’t be long before other religious groups are amping-up their apologetic arsenal. We better jump on this now, because evangelicals can’t handle an onslaught of Dada trained Jehovah’s Witnesses.

If you don’t achieve the same amazing results as with Al Atheist above, then you obviously are not using the method correctly. If this is the case, then review the article on Ad Baculum apologetics and you should receive better results.

Tired of Bad Arguments

2005-08-04T11:04:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Science

I am no expert on ID Theory nor do I pretend to be. As a matter of fact I don't really care for science at all; metaphysics and epistemology are infinitely more interesting in my opinion. So why am I writing on this topic? Well, because I can't stand bad arguments and the debate over ID Theory is full of them. This entry was inspired by an hour of the "Diane Rhem" show on NPR. The show was, overall, fair-minded and represented both sides pretty well (for NPR). What drove me nuts though is the unspoken assumption that evolution is a matter of fact and that modern science depends on it for its very existence. Science would not be science, they claim, if it were not for evolution. This is ridiculous! Modern science was being done long before the theory of evolution came to be the accepted theory and it did just fine. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that modern science developed as a direct influence of a theistic worldview. Regardless, the fact is that you can learn to do science, and to do it very effectively, without knowing the first thing about either the theory of evolution or intelligent design; for neither evolution nor ID are, in the strictest sense, science. Why? Simple, you cannot reproduce or verify either through experimentation. These are forensic conclusions based on observed effects and using the evidence available to reason back to their probable cause. What is frustrating is that this criticism is leveled only against the ID position when it in fact it applies to both positions.

Another argument that drives me nuts, but is used all the time, is the claim that there is a difference between "scientific truth" and "religious truth." Nonsense! Truth is truth. Whatever corresponds to reality is true be it science or religion. Granted all truth cannot be arrived at by means of the scientific method (evolution, if it is truth, is included in this category) but the scientific method is not the only means of arriving at truth. You could say that religious truth and scientific truth are arrived at by different means, that is fair, but what the proponents of this argument are really saying is that these two truth exist in entirely separate spheres of knowledge and reality. Does the proponent of evolution really believe that, for the man of faith, the world was actually created by God? Hardly. Can the origins of the world be both evolutionary for the scientist and created for the man of faith? Not unless the laws of logic have suddenly been suspended. Observation should tell any scientist that these opposing ideas cannot both be true; and this is really the core of the issue. However, the question of origins is not one that is open to scientific inquiry. Science is not being defended (or attacked) in either case, what is being debated is the best interpretation of the fact that there are things that exist. What the evolutionists are really defending here is naturalism and materialism over and against supernaturalism and theism (and lets be honest, ID may not support any one religion but it certainly is arguing for theism of some sort), not science; philosophy, not biology.

To close, Let me summarize what is really being said behind the rhetoric: "Look, we evolutionists deal in the real world where we all know that there is nothing supernatural. If it helps you "creationists" to sleep at night to believe in fairies, or demons or God, or any other superstition then we will let you call that "religious truth", which we know is a euphemism for fantasy, and allow you to continue to wallow in your medieval ignorance while we do something useful." It is smug, condescending, and belittling to people who are quite intelligent and have an extremely legitimate argument. It is ideology and not science that is keeping ID Theory from being taken seriously. What we have here is really a battle between worldviews, not scientific methodologies. Science will go on just fine without either evolution or intelligent design, but ID is grounded in good scientific, physical, and mathematic evidence and should be given a fair hearing.

And here is the rest of it.

Postmodern Youth Ministry - Tony Jones

2005-07-25T18:36:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Theology

Tony Jones wrote a book entitled, "Postmodern Youth Ministries". At first glance I thought the book would be a refutation of postmodernism. Unfortunately I was wrong. In his book, Tony explains, and agrees with, various tenents of postmodernism. He writes:

-Objectivity is out, subjectivity is in. One person, or group of people, cannot claim an objective viewpoint. To be objective means one can stand outside of something, look in, and judge it. But you cannot really be objective because you're always stading somewhere...

-Question everything. Nothing escapes deconstruction. There are no thoughts, theories, assumptions, or hypotheses that get a free pass, even if they make perfect sense...

-There is no Truth with a capital "T." Truth is in the eye of the beholder - one person's truth is another person's theory. So, as I found out sitting at a table trying to persuade a postmodern nonbeliever with foundationalist arguments, the language surrounding religion and belief has changed. Everything is relative.

-Never make lists! Things are simply not objectively quantifiable... Chaos and inevitability are the rule, so when you make a list or attempt to quantify something, you will surely leave something out (which I surely have), and you will definitely betray your own subjectivity (which I definitely have).

As Gandolf said to Saruman, "Tell me friend, when did reason give way to madness?" Forgive me for the strong rhetoric, but madness is exactly what this is! These are the thoughts of a mind given over to passion. Unfortunately for Tony and his friends at Youth Specialties, when men are ruled by their passions, they become slaves of their own fallen nature. Passion may be inclined toward the perfection of our nature, but it MUST be guided by reason!

What Tony and his colleagues are doing will immediately and ultimately undermine the faith of his followers. This should be clear upon reading these tenents, for they are more secular than the writing of some atheists. These postmodern lines of thought are what C.S. Lewis strongly rejects in his article "The Poison of Subjectivism". Ideas have consequences, and the consequences of these tenents do more harm than good.

A Metaphysical Argument for God's Immutability

2005-07-18T05:46:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy, Theology

Understanding how an being of Pure Act does not change in becoming a cause requires a an understanding of efficient causality. The efficient cause is that by which something comes to be or exists. The efficient cause of this post is me, I am the means by which the writing comes to be. In order for me to cause this post I must exist as a being; I must be in full act as the agent of the cause; and the post I am writing must be actually receiving the action of writing. All of these qualifications are being met in my writing of this paper. I am a being, I am in the full act of composing the post, and there is actually a post being written. The causality of my act is entirely in the post, nothing is being caused in me as an agent.
How is it though, that an efficient cause can effect change but does not itself change? First, there is no necessity for the agent to change when it causes something. When I type this post I do not change nor do I lose anything. In putting my ideas into the post through these words I do not lose the ideas, nothing in my knowledge changes. To better explain this take the example of a stereo which is turned on and playing music. The stereo is in the full act of playing music. Anything with the capacity to hear will be caused to hear music when they come into proximity of the stereo (especially if the volume dial goes to 11). However, the stereo in causing a being to hear music does not change, all of the change is in the patient not in the agent.

It may be objected that in our experience an efficient cause does change in causing an effect. For instance if I purchase something I must pay for it and in so doing I lose money and change in what I possess. In all reality I do lose something even in typing this post, namely, the energy it took me to create it; the same is true for the stereo in playing music. The loses here, however, are not a function of efficient causality but a consequence of materiality. If an agent does change in causing something to be, it is because the agent itself is a material being and is itself dependent upon another cause; it too has an efficient cause. The agents of our experience are never in absolute act and thus because of their potency do change even in causing things. This, however, has no bearing on the nature of efficient causality which, in itself, as a cause from an agent in full act, does not cause any effect in anything other than the patient.

From this evidence, it can be concluded that a being of Pure Act could not possibly change in causing anything. A being who is Pure Act could only act as the efficient cause since this being is always in full act. As Pure Act, this being would have no materiality or potential since act in the order in which it is act is unlimited and unique (see post below Defense of a Metaphysical Theorem) and consequently, as efficient cause, not only would this being not change, but it could not change. The effects of Pure Act would reside exclusively in the patients. Pure Act may only cause effects, it cannot be effected.

Why Metaphysics?

2005-07-12T18:55:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

Aristotle said that all men desire to know. We regularly ask questions about the world around us. These questions include questions about emotions, human nature, knowledge, ethics, politics, religion, history, and free will, just to name a few. It is clear then, that we find value in the sheer gaining of knowledge. We understand that knowledge is valuable for it’s own sake and for the sake of achieving some other end.

In our search for knowledge we are confronted with problems, puzzles, and difficulties. When confronted, we often ask ourselves questions that help us solve these problems. For example, when confronted with the question of the ethical status of abortion, we often step back and ask fundamental questions that are related to the topic at hand. We may evaluate whether or not there are such things as objective morals. We may look at whether or not persons have intrinsic value. We may also look at whether or not the person in question is a human being. Ultimately, however, all of these questions rely on our metaphysical position.

For example, how you answer the question of the objectivity of morals is largely dependant on your metaphysical assumptions about the status of transcendentals. The question of whether or not a fetus is a human being is entirely a metaphysical question. In fact, it is the pivotal question when discussing the issue of abortion. If metaphysics is fundamental to answering one of the most important ethical questions of our day, then those who say that metaphysics is the pretentious pursuit of impractical philosophical knowledge are clearly mistaken. Metaphysics is profoundly practical.

Metaphysics is also necessary as a proper support for the sciences. All people, including scientists, have some notion of what it is to be real. These ideas carry over into all fields of study. A psychologist may conclude that people should be treated as objects because he has a metaphysical commitment to some form of materialism. The psychologist, knowingly or unknowingly has worked out his metaphysics into his psychology.

The physicist may conclude that subatomic particles "pop" out of existence and then "pop" back into existence. This conclusion is often arrived at without the physicist realizing that he has just entered the realm of metaphysics. When the particle ceases to exist and comes back into existence in another place, the metaphysician immediately asks about the identity of that particle: a question physicists may not be inclined to ask. However, the question of the identity of the particle is certainly an important one for the theoretical physicist.

Another benefit of metaphysics is that it brings unity to the sciences. All sciences study real things. Biology studies plants and animals. Sociology attempts to study social tendencies. Epistemology studies knowledge. Only metaphysics studies the real, which is common to all sciences. A proper understanding of the real offers a context in which to make accurate scientific inferences.

Finally, the study of metaphysics helps to unify our own person. Most people go through life with a fragmented self. They are unable to connect ideas from different areas of their life. Their work is unrelated to their religion. Science and ethics are in mutually exclusive categories. Politics is something that politicians should concern themselves about, but we should be concerned with putting food on the table. Metaphysics helps us begin to put together the pieces and gives us a framework from which we may order our knowledge.

The Dodecahedron of Opposition

2005-07-12T09:41:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

The Dodecahedron of Opposition:
Thinking Outside the Boydian Hexagon
Douglas Beaumont, M.A.A.

Introduction

Gregory Boyd, Thomas Belt, and Alan Rhoda have proposed a new solution to the problem of God’s omniscience and the fact that it does not fit with their desired view of God.[1] They report that “one common line of reasoning supporting this traditional belief is the following:

P1: All propositions are either true or false (bivalence).
P2: God knows the truth value of all propositions (omniscience).
P3: The future can be exhaustively described in terms of what either will or will not come to pass.
C: Therefore, God knows the future exclusively as that which either will or will not come to pass.”

They admit that the argument is formally valid, however, they argue, “the third premise (P3) can be plausibly denied. This premise, we maintain, is arbitrarily restrictive. There are three, not two, distinct modes in terms of which future events may be described. . . . What P3 overlooks, however, is that may also be the case (3) that S might and might not obtain.”

The authors claim that “S’s obtaining is indeterminate— neither inevitable nor impossible,” and go on to propose that western philosophy’s failure to recognize this possibility is that the Aristotelian Square of Opposition “fails to make the logical possibility of genuine indeterminacy sufficiently explicit.” When the authors add these extra possible states of affairs to the square they derive a “Hexagon of Opposition”.

I argue that in fact, even this hexagon is too restrictive, for it only allows for future indeterminacy. Why not the past? It is logically possible that I might or might not have written this article. Thus, to really cover our bases we need to add past indeterminacy statements.

As is obvious from reality the past affects the future. For example if five minutes ago I had made the statement S1 that: “In two minutes event (E) might or might occur” these two possibilities would exist as subcontraries that are both possibly true. However – the same event could also be referred to from a future vantage point , viz. S2: “Two minutes ago event (E) might or might not have occurred.” These are also subcontraries that could have both been possibly true depending on the truth value of S1 which is dependant on E.

To use the author’s example: S = “Hilary will be president in 2008” might or might not be true in 2004. However, the truth value of S might or might not be true. Therefore my statement about S (Ss) must be assigned values as well. When added to the possible future possibilities which are contingent on the possibly past possibilities it looks something like Figure 1 below. I like to think of this as the “Dodecahedron of Opposition.” Note that the traditional square(s) and hexagon(s) are still present, but now their restrictive nature has been replaced by possible future / past possibilities.

Figure 1: The Dodecahedron of Opposition

But does this really exhaust the possibilities? Suppose that statement (Ss1) is made: “Event (E2) [such that statement S1 might or might not be true] might, or might not, occur.” In this case E2 not only has both possibly true (in the case that S1 is true in that it might be both true or false) and possibly false possible possibilities (in the case that S1 is true in that it might be both true or false), but E2’s truth value is dependant on the truth value of the possibility of S1 being true - which itself is a possibility!

Conclusion

In the interest of cool titles further refinements to this model (which is obviously true despite the fact that it has been missed by the greatest thinkers of the past 5,000 years up until Greg Boyd and myself) will have to wait until I can find out what a 144 sided figure is called.

[1] All quotes from Gregory Boyd, Thomas Belt, and Alan Rhoda, The Hexagon of Opposition: Thinking Outside the Aristotelian Box

Good Catholics should be ID friendly?

2005-07-07T13:14:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Science

Michael Behe is expressing his joy at ID the Future, and I can't blame him. What is he excited about? It turns out that a Catholic Archbishop is arguing forcefully for the design inference as a part of rational and scientific investigation. In Behe's summation,

He essentially says in so many words that neo-Darwinism is wrong and ID is right. He writes that the conclusion that life is designed is not a matter of faith, but a matter of physical evidence. He says the denial of that evidence is itself ideology; in other words, the denial of the evidence is the faith, the affirmation of the evidence is rational.

Right on. Meanwhile, the Panda's Thumb waxes about how one is supposed to actually interpret the op-ed piece. Now the question is: how are we to interpret the Panda's Thumb?

Contrary to PT, it seems to me that the Archbishop does more than recommit to classical theistic evolution, which usually demands that God's actions in the world be hidden to scientific/rational inquiry. Rather, he extends the sphere of reason to ID-friendly teleology (a la Behe). And this is precisely what needs to be argued. But you can decide for yourself (you may need to sign up for the NYTimes, which is free.)

A Defense of a Metaphysical Theorem

2005-07-06T18:12:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

Act in the order in which it is act is unlimited and unique unless conjoined with passive potency.

In order to defend this theorem we must begin with an understanding of what act is in itself. In our experience, act is a co-principle of being, co-relative and opposite from potency. Act in itself is any sort of actuality, determination or perfection and relates to potency in that potency is the capacity to act. As such, the two are mutually exclusive principles; that is, where one is present the other cannot be. Thus, from our experience act is the actualization of some potency and coming-to-be of some perfection or determination in a being.

All of the existents which we experience are limited beings composed of act and potency. But which of these two co-principles is the source of the limitation of being? It is true that all acts are limited acts in our experience, but does this mean that act is limited as act? Act does not limit itself, but is limited by potency. As a human I have the ability to act in many ways, for example running, but I cannot run in a non-human way. The act of my running is limited by the potency inherent in what I am. I cannot run as a cheetah, not because running is limited but because my running is limited by my potential for running as a function of what I am as a being. Running in itself is without limit in the order of running, but is limited by the potency of the existent that has the capacity to do the running. In the same way a metal blade has the potency to have the act of sharpness, but only within the limits of being a metal blade. It cannot have the sharpness of a stone blade or a carbon fiber blade; the act of sharpness, this perfection, is limited by the being’s potency for that act. Essentially, as a determining principle, act is limited to its determination by the confines of that in which it inheres. Act can only act within the limits allowed by the receptive capacity of that which receives the act; this is passive potency. For instance, accidents, in the sense in which they are acts, are limited in their expression by the substances in which they exist. A dog has the capacity to have the accidental act of being brown, but this act is limited to being the brownness of a dog; a dog does not have he capacity to receive the brownness as a horse, it must receive it as a dog. Thus the act which is unlimited itself, is limited by the passive potency of the being in which it inheres.

This theorem is particularly important when dealing with the existential act. Esse is the ultimate actuality as the act prior to all other acts. In our experience we do not find unlimited esse, all existential acts of our experience are limited by the existents which possess those acts. So what is the limiting factor of esse? It cannot be esse itself because then being would be limited to this, and no other existences would be possible. Esse then must be limited by essentia in existents. This we see clearly to be true. The act of existing in itself is unlimited but in existents is limit ed to be the kind of being of the essence it actualizes. Thus, essence is the determining factor of esse and existence is limited by the passive potency of the essence which receives the act. A dog is limited to existing as a dog, not by the act of existing but by the essence of being a dog.

Highly Effective Ways to Argue Theism #47: The Argument From Dogmatic Hypothetical Affirmation

2005-07-03T18:36:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

The argument is as follows (and works best during a heated debate with a non-thiest):

"Let's just say for the sake of argument that God exists.

Well, see . . . God exists"

Source:
M. Spicher's friend

But is it true for you?

2005-07-01T09:05:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

Abstract: In this paper, I take a look at epistemological relativism, and conclude that it isn't true for me.

RELATIVISM: REVIEWED, REFUTED, REFINED

Relativism is the belief that the truth of any given proposition can only be evaluated according to considerations that vary between individuals or groups of individuals. Among these considerations are time, place, culture, conceptual framework, or personal conviction. Epistemological relativism (the focus of this paper, henceforth ER) is to be distinguished from moral relativism, in that the former deals with the truth of propositions, and the latter with the value or ethical force of prescriptions. Some consider its conclusions to be an alternative to absolutism. Absolutism is the belief that the truth of any given proposition can be evaluated according to some neutral criteria, criteria that do not beg the question in favor of any considerations above.

So what? Do we really need to talk about this? Harvey Siegel, way back in 1987, traced relativism's development from Protagoras to contemporary reformulations.¹ He concluded that the initial refutation by Plato applies in some modified form to those later attempts to reintroduce it. Before examining the arguments, let's say that relativism has been refuted successfully in the philosophical literature, and that there is little if anything new to say on the subject.

On the other hand, outside of philosophical circles, relativism is more than just an open question. Indeed, as a catchphrase--"its all relative, anyways"--a whole lot of people believe it. So in The Closing of the American Mind, Allan Bloom muses:

There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the students' reaction: they will be uncomprehending. That anyone should regard the proposition as not self-evident astonishes them, as though he were calling into question 2 plus 2 = 4. These are things you don't think about.²

The truth in this oft-quoted passage gives significant motivation for our project. The trend Bloom observed eighteen years ago has certainly not dissipated. Look at the internet. When we are inundated with such a myriad of conflicting beliefs and opinion, on all conceivable issues, and imparted with all conceivable levels of certainty, it may become more difficult for some to understand how non-question begging criteria can be invoked to judge between those beliefs.

Thus, the aims of this paper are three. First, we will briefly look at versions of relativism that have shown up in the history of philosophy. Second, we will offer critiques, primarily through the work already done by its best critics. Third, we will develop a valid absolutism that takes into account the insights offered by previous attempts at a coherent relativist philosophy.

Epistemological Relativism: From Protagoras Outward

In Plato's Theaetetus we receive the classic formulation of ER in its extreme. Plato presents a fictional Socrates, who is drawing out a theory of knowledge from the young student Theaetetus, through the dialectical method. Socrates compares his student's theory to the position of the great Protagoras. "He says, you remember, that 'man is the measure of all things'-alike of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not."³ This may serve as a thesis statement for ER. He goes on to clarify the position: "any given thing is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you, you and I being men."⁴ In this basic relativism, then, the individual determines what is true and what is false. In the words of Theaetetus, "Knowledge is nothing but perception."⁵ Indeed, Socrates notes, it can be seen as a rather popular opinion; he quotes a number of pre-Socratic philosophers, and even Homer, to support the view.

After discussing it in depth, Socrates offers several criticisms of the view. The first is summed up here:

I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men-would not this have produced an over-powering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking ad captandum in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this must be the case if the Truth of Protagoras is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.⁶

Let us consider the content of this criticism. Socrates notes that it is arbitrary to call "man" the measure of all things, and not a "dog-faced baboon" or some other creature. Why is it arbitrary? He explains: if the individual is the measure of all things, then there is no reason to accept the view coming forth from the supposedly wise Protagoras as superior. In fact, there is no reason to accept the view at all, because, if "each one is the measure of his own wisdom," then one's own perception, and not that of Protagoras, would be solely determinative of his knowledge. Socrates then extends it to his own project of teaching through 'midwifery,' or the dialectical tutelage of younger students like Theaetetus. In ER's account, there is no reason or justification for Socrates to be weighing or "supervising" the opinions of others, if it is, by definition, true for the one who perceives it to be. We could extend insight to question the need for teaching at all, if relativism were true.

Siegel recommends that we call this the "'undermines the very notion of rightness' (henceforth UVNR) argument."⁷ Following his recommendation, we will adopt this styling as one of the main charges against relativism. The point is that ER, in at least its "Protagorean" form, undermines the notion of rightness, sound judgment, and thus the value of knowledge itself. As Siegel summarizes it, "relativism is incoherent because, if it is right, the very notion of rightness is undermined, in which case relativism cannot be right."⁸

Another Socratic criticism is here:

In that case, Protagoras, what are we to make of your doctrine? Are we to say that what men think is always true, or that it is sometimes true and sometimes false? From either supposition it results that their thoughts are not always true, but both true and false. For consider...are you, or is any Protagorean, prepared to maintain that no one regards anyone else as ignorant or as making false judgments?
...That, however, is the inevitable consequence of the doctrines which makes man the measure of all things.⁹

So not only is it impossible, claims UVNR, to call something right, but it is also impossible to call any judgment false. One might wonder whether this is such a condemning criticism. After all, if no judgment can be called false, then it may seem like everyone is a winner. Everyone gets their own pat on the back, for everyone has already fulfilled the difficult task of determining their reality, just by perceiving it. Is this necessarily a problem? Socrates explains:

Protagoras, for his part, admitting as he does that everybody's opinion is true, must acknowledge the truth of his opponents' belief about his own belief, where they think he is wrong...Then, since it is disputed by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is true to nobody-to himself no more than to anyone else.¹⁰

And so Socrates turns the tables on his elder, Protagoras. The problem is that if we are to assume that no beliefs are false, then Protagoras would have to admit to the truth (the truth for them) of those beliefs which negate his. But it does not follow that the beliefs of his opponents are likewise falsified-to wit, if they dispute ER, then they are not falsified by it at all. It is true-to-them that relativism is false. So relativism is false-to-them. It cannot therefore falsify their view in the same way that their determination falsified relativism. Thus, if relativism is true, it is false.

Siegel has another name for this wing of Socrates' criticism: "'necessarily some beliefs are false' (henceforth NSBF)."¹¹ That is precisely the point: some beliefs are necessarily going to be false, and if relativism is assumed, then it is that false belief. Another way of saying this is that the opposite of true is false (which is the law of non-contradiction), and that, by affirming the truth of its contrary, relativism allows for itself to be falsified in its own system.

Let us put it more systematically, in a way that incorporates a broader view than that of Protagoras, who radicalized relativism to an individual level. ¹² ER states that for any claim c, c can be judged or assessed according to the standards of s1,...sn, in order to determine truth or falsity; but given another set of standards s`1,...s`n, there is no neutral set of standards which can arbitrate between the two.¹³ The truth or falsity of claim c is thus always relative to the set of standards used to judge it as true or false. The upshot of ER is that there is no way to evaluate conflicting evaluations of the truth or falsity of claim c.¹⁴

The first criticism (UVNR) is as follows. Assume validity (or rational justification, or superiority to its alternative, or rightness) for ER. This requires a neutral set of standards by which the validity of UVNR can be evaluated. Yet this neutral set of standards is precisely what ER disallows. Thus, ER cannot be valid (or rationally justifiable, or superior to its alternative, or right), because it undermines the very notion of validity (or rational justification, or superiority to alternatives, or rightness).¹⁵

The second criticism (NSBF) is as follows. Assume validity of ER. If it is valid, then it allows for non-ER but equally valid sets of standards by which truth claims may be judged. There is no neutral standard by which we judge between non-ER standards and ER standards; moreover, non-ER standards determine ER to be false by some neutral standard (i.e. neutral by their standard); therefore, ER is false.

Relative and Absolute Truth: Who's Begging the Question?

How can ER, in response, rejoin against these charges? It will not do merely to allow ER to be invalidated and falsified through these ancient Socratic criticisms, will it? What is missing? ER can go in two ways in response, of which the absurdity of one way will become immediately apparent. The absurd direction is to argue that, no, ER is in fact absolutely true, for some set of reasons. This wording indicates the absurdity immediately, as relativism cannot be true in any absolute sense, without undermining relativism.

But the other route is to claim that the criticisms themselves beg the question, in that they judge ER by a standard it does not require of itself (or any other standards): that of absolute truth. In other words, the criticisms of ER presume absolute truth, in order to show that an epistemology, which denies absolute truth, is absolutely false. But if the criticisms fault ER for denying absolute truth, whereas relativism has some other theory of truth, then the criticisms beg the question. It is not so apparent that this way of rejoinder is absurd, and there may be good reasons to think it is true. So we must consider whether UVNR or NSBF beg the question by assuming absolute truth in the first place.

Indeed, regarding the UVNR and NSBF criticisms as such, they either beg the question, or are not yet necessarily a disproof of ER. If they assume uncritically that ER must rely upon some notion of absolute truth, then they beg the question. If they do not assume that relativism must rely upon some notion of absolute truth, then the arguments serve to demonstrate something important, but also unsurprising. Namely, they demonstrate that any version of ER is wholly incoherent, but only to the extent that it must rely upon a concept of absolute truth. That much is certain and should be obvious to anyone reading. But what is not certain (from the preceding discussion) is that relativism could not be based on some other conception of truth, one that is untouched by the classic Socratic criticisms. Thus we must attempt to treat ER in terms of some concept of "relative truth," by which we can then determine whether ER can be salvaged.

The difficulty, however, is establishing a concept of relative truth that does not itself rest on some concept of absolute truth. Absolute truth is defined as that which corresponds to reality for all persons, places, and times.¹⁶ It is universal. So is relative truth that which is which corresponds to reality only for an individual (or place or time), or some group of individuals (or places, or times)? Surely it means at least this.

But it is hard to see how even this sine qua non of relative truth evades UVNR and NSBF, or how it evades relying upon an absolute notion of truth. Actually, the definition appears to be only delaying the inevitable. For if some statement is true for either some people, some places, or some times, must we not also admit that it is true for all people, all places, and all times, that the statement is true for some people, some places, or some times? In other words, even if I say claim x is only true-for-me (relative truth), is it not true-for-me for everyone (absolute relative truth)? Certainly it is incoherent to say that claim x is true-for-me for me. What then shall we say?

Perhaps the concept of relative truth will allow no further qualifications. That is, if claim x is true-for-me, then that is all; the matter of its correspondence to my reality cannot be considered true or false for anyone else. It is true-for-me, and that claim means nothing with respect to another's perspective. The problem here becomes immediately apparent, however. If it cannot mean anything with regards to truth or falsity for anyone else, then whether or not its true-for-me is literally meaningless, because it is already admitted to mean nothing (as regards any notion of truth) to anyone but the person recommending it. For example, if someone else says, "Nadler thinks that claim x is true; so in ER, x is true-for-Nadler," we must suppose he means to make a true statement, in that it is a statement which corresponds to reality (i.e. the statement maker's reality, if ER). However, if relativism is true in this sense, then that statement's correspondence cannot be so (or not so) for anyone but the individual for whom it's true. So why read another person's paper on the subject of ER? It is clear that UVNR applies to this concept of relative truth, rendering ER as incoherent as when the suggestion was not brought up. The possibility of finding an intelligible concept of relative truth is not yet actualized. UVNR and NSBF were either right to assume a concept of absolute truth underlies ER, or we must look further for a valid concept of relative truth.

Jack Meiland thinks he has found such a notion which escapes the clutches of absolute truth. He makes the following distinction:

(1) The concept of absolute truth seems to be a concept of a two-term relation between statements (or perhaps propositions) on the one hand and facts (or states of affairs) on the other. But the concept of relative truth, as used by some relativists, seems to be a concept of a three-term relation between statements, the world, and a third term which is either persons, world views, or historical and cultural situations.

(2) The relation denoted by the expression 'absolute truth' is often said to be that of correspondence. The relativist can make use of this type of notion and say that 'P is true relative to W' means something like 'P corresponds to the facts from the point of view of W' (Where W is a person, a set of leading principles, a world view, or a situation).¹⁷

Granting that this three-term relation is merely meant by Meiland to be a step forward in understanding the meaning of relative truth, we must evaluate it on those grounds. Does it make a step forward toward a viable notion of relative truth? Let us consider Meiland's conclusions:

When we use expressions of the form 'P is true for W', it seems legitimate to ask the question "What does 'true' mean in this expression?"...The correct relativist answer to this question is: "It means that P is true-for-W." The hyphens in this answer are extremely important. For they show that the relativist is not talking about truth but instead about truth-for-W. Thus, one can no more reasonably ask what 'true' means in the expression 'true-for-W' than one can ask what 'cat' means in the word 'cattle'. 'True-for-W' denotes a special three-term relation which does not include the two-term relation as a distinct part.¹⁸

Since "the hyphens in this answer are extremely important," we will start there to try to understand whether the three-term relation is not in fact reducible to the two-term relation. Meiland says that "truth" (the absolute notion) cannot be drawn from "truth-for-W" (the relative notion), noting that "one can no more reasonably ask what 'true' means in the expression 'true-for-W' than one can ask what 'cat' means in the word 'cattle'." Siegel notes that 1) the analogy here is incorrect, and 2) if correct, it renders the notion of relative truth all the more hopeless.¹⁹ He expands the points well, but I would like to make additional comments on each point.

First, it is far more reasonable to ask what 'true' in 'true-for-W' means than to ask what 'cat' means in 'cattle'. For 'cat' in the word 'cattle' means something in English only incidentally--but etymologically, 'cat' comes from the Latin root cattus, whereas 'cattle' comes from the root capitalus, through the old French chatel.²⁰ The meaning of 'cat' has nothing to do with 'cattle'. This is why it would be unreasonable to ask what 'cat' means in the word 'cattle', just as it would be unreasonable to ask what 'tle' means in 'cattle'. But is that a fair analogy to 'true-for-W'? It is clear that it is not. Indeed, the hyphens in the phrase may be extremely important, but they are not important because they erase the independent meaning of any of the three words in the phrase, but rather because they preserve the meaning of each of the independent terms. Otherwise, the phrase is a highly absurd choice for terminology. If the point of the hyphens was to erase the distinction between the three individual words, then there is no reason to keep the individual words, which of course each have their own meanings. It would be just as effective to say, "'claim x is true for me,' means that claim x is ?," and then proceed without ever defining what ? is.

The problem is that we want to know what relative truth is, and we will not merely be content to hear that it is nothing like absolute truth. This is begging the question, which we do not want for the relativist any more than for the absolutist. So this is the second problem with his argument summary: if 'true-for-W' is nothing like 'true,' what is it like? What does it mean?

We recall that Meiland asserts "the concept of relative truth...seems to be a concept of a three-term relation between statements, the world, and a third term which is either persons, world views, or historical and cultural situations." In order for this to be a three-term relation, not reducible to the two-term relation, we need a clearly understood notion for each term as separable yet relatable to the other. This, as both Siegel and Meiland agree, obtains for a two-term correspondence of absolute truth.²¹ The statement about reality is clearly different than the reality to which it corresponds, if true, yet it relates to the world through that correspondence. Yet how does a person (or W) relate to his statement, or the world? Siegel notes that this cannot be true for ER, where the whole point is inseparability between the world and W. In ER, the world is the world-as-it-is-to-us, or the world-in-worldview, if you will. Otherwise, if the world could be understood separately from the person and his W, what is it but an absolute conception of truth, yet again? Indeed, it is absolute truth. In that two term relation, no absolutist would argue that the person making statements about the world is not making them through some worldview or perceptions of some kind. So, Siegel notes, it not a three-term relation at all, but a two-term relation of statements about the world-in-W and world-in-W (or world-to-the-individual). This is the meaning of claim x being true-for-W: claim x corresponds to the world-in-W.

But, in this case, what we have is the classic problem of perception, and nothing more. Although it seemed for a moment that Meiland furthered the case for relative truth, his insights really brought us full circle. We still ask: Is it possible to arbitrate between worlds, or is each person bound to knowing a world-to-himself, which is true-to-himself? We already answered this. The claim of our ancient Theaetetus that "knowledge is perception"-which is all this is-falls to the same criticisms of UVNR and NSBF, and so we have not come up with a successful definition of relative truth as such. For if knowledge is perception, then we must ask: is the claim that knowledge is perception such that it can be perceived as true, and if another perceives the claim to be false, does not their claim about ER's failure itself obtain to truth? If a claim is true because it is perceived as such through some world view, then what of those world views which hold to the falsity of the thesis that a claim is true because it is perceived as such through some world view? Those claims to knowledge that falsify relativism would be at least as valid as relativism itself. Moreover, absolute truth is able to deal with the problem of perception, but without identifying knowledge with it. So, there is no reason to accept ER based on relative truth (UNVR). Furthermore, according to a view it holds to be correct for the perceiver, it is false (NSBF). ²²

It is important to note that ER cannot be sustained on a version of relative truth, and thus succumbs to the classical criticisms.²³ But now is no time to take a break. We are still in need of recovering an absolutist epistemology that takes into account the values that sustained support for the chimera of ER.

Relativism or Falliblism: Choose Wisely

Some contemporary relativists have a tendency to confuse absolutism with what we shall call infallible foundationalism. So Harold Brown defines the following as an absolutist assumption, which he rejects: "we are justified in making a knowledge claim only if it is based on an unquestionable foundation."²⁴ Michael Krausz summarizes Clifford Geertz-a self-described "anti anti-relativist"-as being against "the de-centering of any one perspective as the absolutely true one."²⁵ This implies that the "anti-relativist"-what we have called the absolutist-must believe that one "perspective" is an absolute perspective by which we judge other perspectives. It assumes that, for the absolutist, all perspectives are judged according to a particular privileged perspective-a perspective which obtains to absolute truth.

One could think of some good reasons to be against this thesis, taken by some to be absolutism. The problem is that it is not at all necessary to a view of absolute truth that there be one absolute perspective by which all other perspectives are evaluated. Likewise, it is unnecessary for absolute truth that there be an "unquestionable foundation" upon which all knowledge claims must be based. But as these issues require some finesse, we will consider them more deeply.

We recall that we defined absolutism as the belief that the truth of any given proposition can be evaluated according to some neutral criteria. What is meant by neutral? By neutral, we mean that the criteria will not favor any particular framework or individual perspective. The term that best captures the meaning of we are considering is public, or even objective. The point is that the criteria does not belong to you or me or any other individual-it is to be shared by all, and may be discovered by anyone.

As such, this criteria is necessarily not limited to a particular perspective. Thus, the goal of "de-centering of any perspective as the any particular true one" is a perfectly acceptable project-if it were the case that absolutists were proclaiming their particular perspective as central. They need not be. Of course, if one merely means that absolutists believe they are correct in what they assert, then one can hardly fault them for that. That's a mark of integrity, after all-to mean and believe in what one is asserting. Representatives of all sorts of differing viewpoints likewise consider their view to be correct, and this is not at all relevant to the whether relativism or absolutism is true. The issue is whether it is necessary to the thesis of neutral criteria that there be an absolutely true perspective. We assert that there need not be for there to be neutral criteria. This is not to say that there is no absolutely true perspective. That there exists a "God's eye view" is a reasonable conclusion of theism-the belief in a God who views. Conversely, it might also be an unreasonable assumption of fascism-the belief in the forced manifestation of a "God's eye view" through the state. But neither are logically prior to absolutism.

For the (modest) absolutist, one thing is needed for objective, neutral criteria-an object of knowledge. All perspectives through which that object is viewed can be considered subjective, by definition. It is the recognition of existence of the object, and thus the objective criteria that flow from the object, which must lead to some form of absolutism. Mortimer J. Adler gives it as the distinction between our "consciousness"-which is subjective-and the objects of our consciousness-which are objective.²⁶

But does absolutism require an "unquestionable foundation"? Again, this would be taking absolutism too far. That something (or some object of consciousness) exists, is indeed absolutely and infallibly true (as are other self-evident propositions). There is no "perspective" which could hold to the contradictory ("nothing exists") and be correct in its assertion. But then, that something exists is also a vague assertion, so very absolutely true because it is so very vague. We could not, by any meaningful accounts, call it an "unquestionable" foundation, whereas it is precisely the questioning of this foundation that offers some content to the absolutely true claim. To explain this point, we will ask the foundation some questions. What is this 'something'? Is it 'Absolute Spirit'? 'Flux'? 'The One'? 'Being'? 'Matter'? What is 'existence'? Is it 'thinking'? 'Subjectivity'? 'Actuality'? 'Materiality'? In this sense, the foundation (here, the law of identity, as applied to some essence) is not incorrigible, but rather revisable. Moreover, because perspectives on the foundational object can possibly answer the questions wrongly, the very content of the foundation is understood not to be infallible, but rather fallible. The foundation is objective existence and that which is self-evident about it, but the rest is up for public discussion-including what in fact is self-evident about it.

Not only is it possible to be a falliblist-to believe that knowledge-claims are not necessarily certain-and remain an absolutist, but we would hold that it is normative to be a falliblist, and be an absolutist. To hold to the necessity of the infallibility of knowledge is as extreme and untrue a view as the view that all truth is relative. "We must believe that what we know is known infallibly" is perhaps the fault of laziness and uncritical thinking, but not the fault of an objective real world.

Yet some contemporary relativists seem to align their view with falliblism as quickly as they mark off the opposing view as unquestioned foundationalism. Brown writes:

"The main thesis of relativist epistemology is that knowledge can be constructed on a fallible foundation. Relativism affirms my right to hold my own presuppositions in spite of their fallibility, to proceed on the basis of these presuppositions, and to reject competing sets of presuppositions as false."²⁷

Let us lay to rest the myth that this is an anti-absolutist thesis. Moreover, if it is to be taken as "the main thesis of relativist epistemology," then we will have to revise our definition of relativism, in the first place, to something rather trivial. It is more likely that the author is confusing relativism with falliblism, an opinion corroborated by Siegel.²⁸ Indeed, absolutism can uphold Brown's "relativist" thesis, with but a cautious caveat that our rights come with the responsibility to maintain a reasonable justification grounding those beliefs, which are admittedly fallible. This reasonable justification appeals to public, neutral criteria. To believe and assert the falsity of competing views, without any justification for doing so, is more than fallible-it is irrational.

Then again, if Brown is proclaiming the right to believe and dogmatically assert whatever one wants to believe and dogmatically assert, then we are not obliged to agree with him. It is our right to use common sense and reject such a thesis, as we can all think of beliefs with absurd and immoral implications, that no one ought to believe or assert. We perhaps should not restrain fools from doing so either. But we will not say it is a "right" for them. But we will remain charitable and assume that Brown is really going after the right to proceed from a fallible foundation, and not mere intellectual anarchy. He ought to become an absolutist, in that case.

Towards an Absolutist Epistemology

Absolutism affirms my right to believe, even though the foundation for belief may be revised, questioned, and fallible. But absolutism does not end there. For since absolutism requires the possibility of neutral criteria by which competing claims can be evaluated, it also affirms my right to investigate the world around me in the pursuit of knowledge, and to make rational judgments regarding the justification for particular beliefs. For without the possibility of neutral criteria, this kind of judgment is impossible. Any judgment made under ER would be arbitrary at best, and thus better kept to one's self.

And so certain unclear notions must further be dispelled. Absolutism is not restrictive as to what one must believe, but rather the assertion that there is something to believe. Radical ER-that which reduces to solipsism of some kind-annihilates the possibility for there being something objective in which to believe, and so that can be described as the most restrictive, and most dogmatic, of our options here. Yet other relativisms which reduce to solidarity within a particular framework, or world view, likewise either disallow for rational arbitration between the two or more competing frameworks, and are thus likewise restrictive in what they deny. Absolutism (even in its most dogmatic state) does allow for arbitration between competing frameworks, theories, and the like.

If "openness" is a value that is driving the acceptance of relativism, perhaps it ought to be reconsidered. ER is ill-equipped for openness, because it does not encourage the investigation into various theories, for the purpose of understanding them in a meaningful way (as true or false). It can, at best, appeal to a superficial attitude of openness. But the attitude alone, if underwritten by ER, will not pay off, for the epistemology is self-defeating and thus ineffective at making epistemological progress. It is like a man who wants to travel so badly that he goes to work at a local airline ticketing agency, without ever taking a flight. He is open to travel, but not employing the means of doing so. Likewise, the relativist may be open to knowledge, but without the means of attaining or evaluating it. He sets the limits at precisely where he would have needed to transcend them to fulfill the value of openness-whether at his individual perspective, or cultural framework, or worldview. The very things which ought to be critically evaluated by an open-minded person cannot be transcended but by an absolutist epistemology. For these things are the limits of his world.

The basis for an absolute epistemology is rationality itself, and so the difficulty for demonstrating absolutism (and not merely refuting its contrary) is to justify rationality. But we will only make a modest case for rationality here. Rationality is grounded in being, and as has already been noted, something exists. If something did not exist, it would be impossible to comment on whether it did or did not exist. Therefore, if something exists, and if that can be known (if we have already asserted it, then it is clear that it is known), then the justifiability of certain beliefs have been shown through a transcendent method. Therefore, a modest case for rationality starts with the existence of something.

Absolutism and Metaphysics

Absolutism is an epistemological issue (it is epistemology's justification, as relativism is its destruction), but we may also consider its metaphysical implications. As briefly addressed earlier, it would seem that there is a particular metaphysical commitment which is required for an absolutist-namely, realism. Realism is defined in manifestly different ways, but the basic concept is that truth corresponds to a real world of objects. However, even if that truth were not defined according to correspondence-something we have been assuming for this paper (because it is the correct view, of course)-an absolutist epistemology is still possible and proper. So it does not seem that even realism, of whatever variety, is strictly a requirement for an absolutist.

Again, absolutism does not force any absolutes (metaphysical or physical) upon the adherent.²⁹ Whatever force of persuasion or compulsion there is comes from the evidence itself. Absolutism allows for the possibility of objective evidence. For example, 'being exists' is a metaphysical statement. But an absolutist epistemology did not require that knowledge (nor does it begin to clarify what 'being exists' might really imply for further developing ontology), but rather provided a posteriori rational justification for why the existence of some being is true universally and absolutely. Relativism is simply the self-defeating denial of that justification or universality.

Conclusion

We have shown how epistemological relativism, from its incipient form outward, has two major criticisms against it. The first is that because relativism undermines the very notion of rightness (UVNR), it cannot be considered correct or cognitively superior to its alternatives, which do not undermine the notion of rightness. The second is that necessarily some beliefs are false (NSBF), and relativism guarantees its own falsity by allowing other views to be (even relatively) true, and those views consider it to be (absolutely) false. Further, we considered how relative truth as a concept is reducible to absolute truth, which indicates the truth of absolutism. 'Relative truth' as such only points to the real philosophical problem of the nature of perspective, which must be addressed, but can be addressed without doing damage to absolutism. We considered how those values which relativism was supposed to be shouldering, are best handled by an absolutism which embraces the possibility of epistemological error and revision, even to the foundational level. Finally, we addressed what an absolutist epistemology would look like, taking into considerations that are raised by relativism. Although a fuller treatment of the many more important versions of ER remains, this basic sketch of its principles and alternative may offer suggestions for how to intelligibly approach those other versions.

ENDNOTES

          ¹ Harvey Siegel, Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987) Much of this paper will be a review of Siegel's book. He concludes, contrary to those who consider the issue dead, that the issue is the most vibrant and essential in philosophy today.
          ² Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 25.
          3 Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 31
          4 ibid., 32
          5 ibid., 29
          6 ibid., 60-61.
          7 Siegel, 4.
          8 ibid.
          9 Cornford, 78.
          10 ibid., 79.
          11 Siegel, 6.
          ¹² ibid, 7. Siegel considers the definition broad enough to cover modern versions of ER, which usually extends the category to which a truth claim is considered relative--be it a conceptual framework, world view, cultural disposition, linguistic bubble, etc. So this encompasses the ER of Quine, Kuhn, Rorty, later Goodman, and, by some estimations, Wittgenstein, depending on whether his "forms of life" are truly irreconcilable between themselves, i.e. whether they are a bona fide relativist category. Unfortunately, space limits our ability to deal with each of these versions separately.
          13 ibid.
          14 ibid., 7.
          15 ibid., 8.
          16 Norman Geisler, "Truth, Nature of," Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999), 743.
          17 Jack Meiland, "Concepts of Relative Truth" The Monist, vol. 60 (1977), 571; quoted in Siegel, 11.
          18 ibid.,12.
          19 ibid.,13.
          20 Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, "cat" and "cattle."
          21 Siegel, 13.
          ²² "Note that it is possible to develop a coherent doctrine of relative truth that is not independent of the concept of absolute truth-much as it is possible to define relative space in terms of absolute space. The point here is not that the concept of relative truth is necessarily incoherent if it relies on the concept of absolute; it is rather that such a concept could not be used in an effort to establish relativism, which denies the legitimacy of the concept of absolute truth." ibid., 172, n. 25.
          ²³ See also Richard Rorty, "Objectivity or Solidarity?" in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, ed. by Michael Krause (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21-34; in philosophy of science, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), though he later denied holding to a fully relativist view.
          24 Harold I. Brown, "For a Modest Historicism," The Monist, vol. 60, 549, quoted in Siegel, 9.
          25 Krausz, 3.
          26 Mortimer J. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), 5.
          27 ibid., 10.
          28 ibid.
          29 ibid. 166

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What's a "Property"

2005-06-29T14:28:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

Since our blog has started we few but proud Moldy Thomists have been repeatedly chastised for our defense of divine simplicity. One of the chief criticisms of our view is that this position holds that God is identical with His properties. We would respond by saying that we hold that God does not have properties, He is a pure act of existence and has no form. This however is beside the point at this time (although I am sure it will draw some response nonetheless). What I would like to know is exactly what is meant by the term "property". It occurred to me that this term is used frequently but I have never seen it defined. I am not well versed in analytic philosophy (although I am now starting to delve into it) so I don't often encounter the term in what I read. Thomas doesn't use it. I would really appreciate it if some of you could help out here. It would greatly help me to better understand the criticism and to engage with those who do not share my views. I look forward to your input. Thanks! And here is the rest of it.

When Did the So-called Corruption of the Christian Scriptures Take Place?

2005-06-24T17:09:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Theology

A Response to the Islamic Challenge that the Holy Bible Has Somehow Been Tainted. By Area 51

There is an ongoing, heated debate that exists between Muslims and Christians over the validity of the Old and New Testaments. The common claim by adherents to Islam is that the Christian Scriptures have somehow been corrupted by man throughout history (besides the portions of the Bible that Muslims use to support Islamic theology, of course). Even though this challenge is severe, it is not one that goes unanswered by the brute facts of history.

In regards to the claim that the scriptures have been corrupted, there are some overall issues that must be considered in the scheme of historical evidence. Namely, it is important to note that before Christ’s time the Old Testament existed in Hebrew, Greek, and partly in Aramaic. Also, before Muhammad’s time there were entire compilations of the Greek New Testament as well as parts of Bibles existing in these additional languages---Syriac, Coptic, Latin, Armenian, and Gothic.

This means that in order for the Bible to have been corrupted after Muhammad’s time, the following events would have had to happen:

1. Representatives from every Jewish and Christian sect and denomination from at least seven or eight nations and languages, who were fighting with each other over controversial issues, would have needed to hold a conference and agree in detail on an explosive issue, namely, the changing of their Scriptures. (Of course, each sect would have wanted to change it to support the particular beliefs that split them in the first place).

2. They would have had to agree on how to issue their new, corrupted version of the Bible.

3. They would have had to convince everyone who had a Bible in any language to exchange it for a new, corrupted version.

4. All the original Bibles would have had to be destroyed, leaving no evidence to succeeding generations.

As one critical Muslim scholar comments on these far-fetched, hypothetical events that would have been necessary in order for the Muslim claim of corruption to be true:

If indeed these events did happen, then who can supply the date and place of such a conference and name the participants and their resolutions? Historical records before Muhammad’s time of events of far less importance exist. Thus it is highly unlikely that there is documented evidence to validate such a history-changing event. In addition, manuscripts exist from long before Muhammad’s birth that agree with
current translations of the Bible. (Accad, BB, 149-50)

In light of this information, the Islamic claim that the Old and New Testaments have somehow been corrupted does not seem to hold much plausibility. The fact that the Bible manuscripts from both before and after Muhammad’s time are in agreement with each other is enough to refute the Muslim challenge of corruption on its own. When did the corruption of the Bible take place if not before or after Muhammad’s lifetime? Why do the manuscripts from before and shortly after the time of Christ match up with today’s Bible translations? The Muslims have no good answers to these questions. Also, there is the issue of the validity of the canon of the Muslim’s very own Koran to be considered as well (e.g. Why was Uthman’s compilation the one standardized and all the others burned? Why is it that some scholars who critically analyze early Koranic manuscripts are either killed or banished from Muslim countries? Etc.) Because of these historical facts, it is quite reasonable to conclude that the Bible stands as credible against the Muslim challenge that the Christian Scriptures have somehow been corrupted over the course of world history.

Sources:
(Accad, Building Bridges, Navpress 1997) 142-51
(Geisler and Saleeb, Answering Islam, Baker 1993)
(Sasan T. Lectures on Islam, Summer 2004)
(I was abducted by 17 aliens in 1998 and held captive for a period of 6 months where some of this information was revealed to me telepathically)

The Greatest Philosophers

2005-06-22T21:00:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

Greatest Philosophers
1. Plato - in terms of influence he really sets the stage for Western Philosophy
2. Aquinas - The only alternative to Plato and creator of the best philosophical system
3. Aristotle - Laid the foundation for Aquinas
4. Plotinus - If you are a Platonist today in any sense of the word it is most likely through Plotinus
5. Kant - In terms of influence I think he is the only modern that comes close to the "Big Four" above

I think greatness is a little pre-mature to be bestowing on any 20th Century thinker. If I had to choose based on influence I would go with Wittgenstein, Satre, Heidegger, Dewey (for his influence on Education alone - I was a high school teacher and endured endless amounts of Dewey) and Russell.

I will abstain from the underdog category except to echo a comment I read and add my vote for Berkeley as the ultimate underdog.

Most Destructive Philosophers - In terms of Impact on the Christian Worldview
1. Nietzsche
2. Hegel
3. Kant
4. Wittgenstein
5. Hume

I would also add 6. Spinoza, 7. Descartes, 8. Feuerbach, 9. Kierkegaard, and 10. Husserl

Ten Questions about Messianic Jews

2005-06-22T16:28:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Theology

I often recieve questions about my Jewish identity. Here are some.

1. What is a Messianic Jew?

A Messianic Jew is a Jew who believes that Jesus (henceforth Yeshua) is the Messiah.

2. Is that like a Christian?

Um...I guess it would be *like* that. Yes.

3. So you're not Jewish anymore.

That's a declarative sentence. What shall I do now.

4. Oops. So how are you still Jewish, then?

Because belief in Yeshua does not remove Jewish identity, and we happen to think its the most Jewish thing you can do. He is the Jewish Messiah.

5. How do other Jews who don't believe in this Yeshua feel about you guys?

For the most part, not so well. The Orthodox consider us 'meshumdim', or traitors, and many more think we have abandoned the true Jewish faith, deceptively dressing up Christianity as a valid Jewish option, whereas they argue that its anything but. Some more 'liberal' Jews are willing to tolerate us, some even engaging in dialogue. But that's more an exception to the rule.

6. Aren't they right? About you being traitors and decievers and all that?

No. We have been rejected by the mainstream Jewish community, to be certain. Also, it is true that they do *feel* betrayed by us. But the feelings of the majority do not determine truth. We serve in the Israeli army (for those who live in Israel), celebrate the Jewish feasts, circumcise our sons, and want to see our children grow up Jewish.

7. Yeah, but they will be fake Jews.

You're doing it again.

8. Right. Sorry. Won't they just be fake Jews?

No. For Messianics, if your mother or father is Jewish, you're a real Jew (Orthodox and Conservative Jews go by the mother only; Messianics and Reform go by either parent). You can hide, pretend it isn't there, but it won't change the facts. Belief in Jesus doesn't alter it either.

9. You are just equivocating on the word "Jew," right? Everytime we ask, we mean religiously, and when you answer you go by ethnicity. Isn't that illogical?

There might have been equivocation, so let's fix that now. Ethnically, a Jew is defined according to the above. Religiously, there is a debate. Messianics think that Yeshua's claims to be the Messiah actually correspond to the facts--for Jews and everyone else. Jews who don't believe in 'that man' obviously differ on this point. So the question is whether what the New Covenant (also called the New Testament) says about Yeshua is true. If it is, Messianic Jews are Jewish religiously. If it isn't, then they aren't. But, ethnically, they would be Jewish in either case.

So, in the end, it is those who would say that Messianic Jews somehow *can't* be Jewish who are confusing you. Either they mean we cannot be Jewish religiously (and so avoid the real issue behind the claim, which is whether or not Yeshua actually is the Messiah), or they mean we are no longer Jewish ethnically (in which case their claim is wrong).

10. What's your problem? Why do you waste your time trying to say you're Jewish?

Because its a fact, and we seek to speak the truth. Moreover, we find what the Bible says about God's love and promises toward the Jewish people to be compelling. Therefore, it is part of an authentic testimony for Jewish believers to maintain their identity in Yeshua.

How Can "Being" Be Predicated of Many Individuals?

2005-06-20T06:33:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Philosophy

The simple fact is that we only encounter individual beings or existents in our experience. In fact non-individuals cannot exist, as such, in themselves for this would result in a contradiction. If a non-individual were to actually exist in itself it would have to be both a singularity in itself and plurality in its existence in other things. However, an existent cannot be both a singularity and a plurality at the same time. The question then becomes if all beings we encounter are individual existents, how is it that we can predicate "being" as something that all of these existents have in common? How can there be a plurality of being? This was the chief question addressed by Parmenides, who reasoned that a plurality of being was impossible. Parmenides asserted that in order for there to be more than one being, beings would have to differ in some way. However, beings could not differ by being because that is what makes them same; moreover, beings could not differ by non-being because non-being is nothing, and to differ by nothing is not to differ at all. This conclusion however is contrary to experience and does not seem to fit reality in which we clearly encounter a multiplicity of individual existents.

There are two keys to solving this puzzle. The first is to make the distinction between being (esse) and a being (ens). "Being"(esse) is not a thing, but the act of existing. Parmenides phrased the question wrong when he said "Being is . . ." Being is the "is" it is not an object of the "is." Being as such is not something we experience but an act that we judge to be true of the beings or existents which we encounter. Each being (ens) which we encounter has its own unique act of existence (esse). Thus the being (esse) of each existent is unique to it.

But how do we explain how this is possible for a multitude of existents. No two existents can have the same act of existing for if they did then you would still have the problem of a single act of existence being a plurality of existential acts. So how is it that esse can be predicated of many beings?

When we predicate esse of some existent we must be careful how we are doing this. We cannot predicate esse of existents in a univocal (completely the same manner) way for this would mean all existents have the same existential act. At the same time, we cannot predicate esse of existents in an equivocal (completely unrelated) manner because the opposite of existence is non-existence. Esse, is properly predicated of existents in an analogous manner, that is, when being, as such, is predicated of existents there is something in the relationship of esse to the existents that is similar, and something in this relationship that is different.

What then is this analogous relationship in which esse can be predicated of many existents? Esse is predicted of multiple beings via a proportional predication. That is there is a similar relationship of proportionality between esse and its various analogates. For instance we can correctly predicate the word "good" of both a shoe and a steak, or the proportion ½ to the numbers (5 and10) and (3 and 6); however, the way in which (5 and 10) related to ½ is not the same as (3 and 6), nor does a shoe relate to the predicate good in the same way as a steak (at least lets hope not). In the same way, being can be predicated proportionally of different beings. For example, being can be predicated of a dog and a building or even a dog an another dog. Each proportionally relates to esse but in its own unique way. Thus the analogy of being is an analogy of individual communication. One existent relates to its esse in a similar and proportional way to the relationship of another existent to its esse. Being is therefore realized individually in each existent with each existent having its own esse.

Ockham and Limited Atonement

2005-06-14T07:16:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Theology

One of the things that fascinates me is the connection between philosophy and doctrine. Delving into the ways in which philosophical presuppositions direct the development of doctrine, affecting them for either good or ill, is something that I find incredibly interesting. Many of my papers at seminary have sought to gain some glimpses into just this type of occurrence. Below you will find a link to one such paper titled "THE INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRONG CALVINIST DOCTRINE OF LIMITED ATONEMENT." Should you take the time to read it I would be very pleased to hear any thoughts you may have on the matter.

Some Highly Effective Ways to Argue Theism

2005-06-10T06:00:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Humor

One time I was open air preaching at Virginia Tech University when a skeptic in the crowd yelled to me, "How do you know that God exists?! You can’t know such a thing!!" I immediately replied, "I’ll show you that God exists right now!!" I then stepped down from my podium and ran directly towards the scoffer while cocking back my right arm as far back as it would go. I was quickly in the scoffer’s direct proximity, and, when I saw that I had an open shot, I punched him right in the nose as hard as I could . . .

. . . I then shouted in his face "There! That should be enough convincing evidence for you, pal!!"

The thing is, this scoffer was rather tough and he didn’t drop to the ground and repent as quickly as I thought he would. He came right back at me and threw some kind of unorthodox combination of punches towards my head. I was able to duck the first two punches thrown, but he caught me with the third shot and hit me right in the temple. I was a bit rattled by this action and I almost hit the ground as a result. Fortunately, I was able to regain my composure and I came right back at him with two stiff jabs and a solid right to the face, followed by a left hook to the body. I barely missed him with one of the jabs, but successfully connected with all of the other shots thrown and the scoffer then fell directly to the ground—he was actually knocked out cold.

Now, this should certainly be a lesson to any potential scoffers—that they shouldn’t mess with me while I am preaching. But, this can also be seen as a great lesson for those who desire to effectively argue theism as well. You see, after the dust had settled from the scuffle, two observers approached me who had seen the whole exchange take place. They said they had been contemplating theism for quite some time and were very impressed on how I handled the situation. After some brief follow-up discussion, they both converted to theism right on the spot and they are now doing graduate research on the topic as we speak.

But wait, there’s more!

There was another time where I was in a formal debate with a prominent Atheist professor at Brown University. During the second round of verbal exchange in the debate, he said something that really ticked me off, so, I walked over to him at the podium and shoved him right in the chest. He tried to come back at me with a clinched fist, but the moderator of the debate stepped in-between us and temporarily broke things up. I immediately flashed back to my wrestling days in high school and I then dropped to the ground assuming the three-point bottom position that is standard in the second round of a tournament style wrestling match. My debate opponent must have been on the exact same page, because, he subsequently hit the floor and assumed the required tournament top wrestling position, grabbing my right arm that I had placed beneath my sternum. Then, out of nowhere, the moderator of the debate blew a whistle—and it was on from there!!!

To my good fortune, right after the whistle blew I was able to perform a textbook spin-out-and-turn-around reversal on the Brown University professor with a subsequent two point take down (on his home turf, even!). After the reversal and take down, I was able to get the professor in a regulation half-nelson and then successfully "Iowa" his leg, rendering his attempts at reversal to no avail. After about 45 seconds of further grappling, I was able to pin his back to the auditorium stage for a full three seconds. The moderator blew his whistle again, and, when I stood up, he raised my arm to the ceiling indicating that an expedient, lop-sided victory had just taken place. The debate judges also saw things in my favor and voted unanimously (5-0) that I was the victor of the debate!

Immediately following my victory in the exchange, a crowd of students who were in attendance approached me and asked questions about theism for nearly and hour! Also, some time later that night, my opponent came to me in private and candidly acknowledged that he had actually been doubting his anti-supernatural positions as of late, and, because of the result of the debate, he was thinking about taking a sabbatical at Southern Evangelical Seminary sometime in the near future in order to further contemplate theism.

Well, all of that being said, I would just like to encourage fellow theists with a few words: When the opposition pulls anything even slightly out of step with you in a debate, don’t just throw up your hands and say "fowl." Feel free to get tough and employ some of the tactics that I have shared with you here today. As you can see, they are fun, exciting, and most importantly, they are highly effective in advancing the cause of theism!

Be strong!!!

Book Meme Three: Revenge of the

2005-06-09T14:06:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Miscellaneous

Number of Books I Own: Although I have never counted, I have about 110 feet worth of books based on my last set of bookcases. If the average is, say, 2 inches that's . . . um . . . (struggling . . . to . . . do . . . math . . .) 660 or so.

Last Book(s) I bought: The Dharma of Star Wars , Star Wars and Philosophy, and Skywalking - for two reasons: one, to keep up with Hipsley and, two, to prepare for a presentation on the religion of Star Wars.

Last Book(s) I Read: Being and God, Mary: A Catholic-Evangelical Debate, plus I started the Chronicles of Narnia series.

5 Books that Mean a lot to Me:

1. Decision Making and the Will of God: great criticism of the popular view, not so great on the positive explanation.
2. Mere Christianity: Lewis is the master, what can I say?
3. When Skeptics Ask: One of my first apologetics books.
4. The Albion Trilogy: I am not into fantasy literature but these tales are worth hearing - morally virtuous and courageous, just what we need in times like these.
5. Ecclesiastes: Had to get at least one Bible book in here, this one is exactly what needs to be heard today.

Contra Islam’s Claim of Rigid Monotheism: Plurality in Eternity is an Inescapable Aspect of Islamic Theology!

2005-06-07T16:22:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Theology

The religions of Islam and Christianity are both monotheistic in their beliefs about God, although there is a key distinction that sets them widely apart from one another. Christianity believes in the existence of God who possesses unity and plurality in the form of the Trinity, while Muslims believe that Allah has a strict unity without any aspect of plurality in eternity (this is what they teach on the surface, anyway).
As experts on Islam, Norm Geisler and Abdul Saleeb, point out, "Islamic monotheism is rigid and inflexible. Its view of God’s unity is so strong that it allows for no plurality in God at all." (Geisler–Saleeb, Answering Islam, p. 134) Unfortunately, this Islamic distinctive creates an overemphasis on the unity of God. Allah is so unified in himself and withdrawn from his creation that there can be very little understood of him by Muslims. The adherents to Islam put such an emphasis on God’s unity that they are virtually agnostic in their understanding of who he is. As missionary to Muslims, Jay Smith, asserts:

According to Islam, Allah is one dimensional; that is he has only one character, which is powerful and imposing. He is an omnipotent and impersonal God, one who is completely transcendent, and therefore quite distant and distinct from his creation. (Smith, The Hermeneutical Key, p. 4)

Although there are many philosophical problems with this understanding of God, the main issue is that their view of Allah’s strict unity causes them to completely deny the theological possibility of plurality in eternity. Along with various passages from the Koran that teach against the triune nature of God (Sura 4:116, 170; 112) this overemphasis of God’s unity is what ultimately leads Muslims to reject the Christian concept of the Trinity altogether.

But, the $64,000 question is this– *Do Muslims really deny plurality in eternity?*

I will assert that Muslims would like to deny plurality in eternity at all cost, but they cannot consistently do so no matter how hard they try. The reason is this: Even though Islam strongly rejects the eternal unity and plurality of the Christian God, their own beliefs come back at them with an unavoidable aspect of plurality in eternity. How is this the case? Simply put, Muslims believe that Allah is eternal, and that the Koran is eternal as well. But no Muslim believes that Allah and the Koran are identically the same. What Muslims must realize is that by accepting another distinct eternal entity (i.e. the Koran) in their theological system, they are actually including an aspect of *dual-plurality* within their view of God and eternity. Basically, Muslims try to deny the possibility of eternal unity and plurality for Christians who believe God is an eternal Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But they do so while being guilty of maintaining plurality for themselves by believing in the simultaneous existence of an eternal God and the eternal Koran. Because of the Muslim view of the eternality of the Koran (and its complete distinction from Allah), plurality in eternity is an inescapable aspect of Islamic theology.

This fact blatantly contradicts the Muslim position of Allah’s rigid eternal unity, and, this contradiction greatly weakens Islam’s argument against the eternal plurality and unity of the Christian Trinity in the process. This seems to pose an unavoidable *shirk-o-rama* for devout Muslims who wouldn’t dare assign any partners to God–that is, except for Allah’s eternal companion and partner–the Holy Koran. Since Muslims are always trying to accuse Christians of being tri-theists because of the plurality of the Trinity, perhaps they should analyze their own plurality in eternity before pointing the polytheistic finger at anyone else. Maybe this would be a major step for Muslims to take on the way to realizing that plurality is a necessary aspect of an eternal God; and therefore, the Christian God is the more plausible deity to adhere to.

Book Meme Too

2005-06-05T14:09:00.000-07:00

Posted in: Miscellaneous

Sorry I couldn't resist either.

Number of Books I Own:
Not even close to enough. Over 450

Last Book(s) I bought:
The Dharma of Star Wars by Matthew Bartolin; Star Wars and Philosophy by Kevin S. Decker (Editor), Jason T. Eberl (Editor), William Irwin (Editor) [these two are for a paper I am preparing and which I will be posting, on the Ethical System of Star Wars]; The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Spirit of Medieval Philosophy by Etienne Gilson; Primer on Post Modernism by Stanley Grenz; The Next Reformation: Why Evangelicals Must Embrace Postmodernity by Carl Raschke

Last Book(s) I Read:
On Being and Essence by Thomas Aquinas; Faith of the Fatherless: The Psychology of Atheism by Paul C. Vitz; Christian Ethics by Norman Geisler; Christianity and Bioethics by Mark W. Foreman; An Introduction to the New Testament: Three Volume Collection by D. Edmond Hiebert

5 Books that Mean a lot to Me:
1. Mere Christianity by C.S. Lewis - This is the first book I read after becoming a Christian and it is the one that got me started in my study of Apologetics and Philosophy.

2. The Lord of the Rings by J. R. R. Tolkien - A truly timeless work and one that I can read over and over again without ever tiring of the characters and the story.

3. Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages by Etienne Gilson - My first steps into the world of Thomism were taken through this book. Its clarity and depth were astounding as well as its ability to capture the beauty and eloquence of Thomistic Philosophy as it related to the relationship of faith to reason.

4. The Master Plan of Evangelism by Robert Coleman - Besides philosophy my other great passions are teaching and discipleship. This book captures the essences of most of what I have learned about both.

5. Being and God: An Introduction to The Philosophy of Being and Natural Theology by George P. Klubertanz and Maurice R. Holloway - This book may be the quintessential introduction to Thomistic Metaphysics. I cannot recommend it highly enough.

Runnerups:
Biography:
Truman by David McCullough
Peter the Great by Robert K. Massie

History:
The Killing of History by Kieth Windschuttle
A World Lit Only By Fire by William Manchester

Literature and Fiction:
Crime and Punishment by Dostoevsky
The Chronicles of Narnia by C.S. Lewis
The Persian War by Herodotus
Harry Potter (all of ‘em) by J. K. Rowling (I don't care they're great stories)
The Collected Essays of Montaigne

Theology:
Systematic Theology I-IV by Norman Geisler
Objectivity in Biblical Interpretation by Thomas Howe
How to Read the Bible as Literature and Get More Out of It by Leland Ryken
He Is There and He is Not Silent by Francis Schaeffer
Can Man Live Without God by Ravi Zacharius

Philosophy:

God and Philosophy by Etienne Gilson
The Portable Nietzsche
Ends and Means by Aldous Huxley
The Republic by Plato